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ABSTRACT
Computer networks are constantly being actively probed in attempts to build topological
maps of intermediate nodes and discover endpoints, either for academic research or nefar-
ious schemes. While some networks employ recommended conventional countermeasures
to simply block such probing at the boundary or shunt such traffic to honey pot systems,
other networks remain completely open either by design or neglect. Our research builds
on previous work on the concept of presenting a deceptive network topology, which goes
beyond conventional network security countermeasures of detecting and blocking network
probe traffic. By employing the technologies from the emerging field of Software-Defined
Networking and the OpenFlow protocol, we constructed a custom-built SDN controller to
listen for network probes and craft customized deceptive replies to those probes. Through
employment of various network probing utilities against our custom-built SDN controller in
a test network environment, we are able to present a believable deceptive representation of
the network topology to an adversary. Therefore, this work demonstrates that the primitives
of the expanding OpenFlow protocol show strong potential for constructing an enterprise-
grade dynamic deceptive network topology solution to protect computer networks.
v
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In this chapter, we discuss the motivation that led to this research with a quick introduction
on network mapping and the OpenFlow (OF) protocol. We will discuss the value this
research has to the Department of Defense (DOD) in the realm of network security and
the intended contributions of this research to previous work on using a deceptive dynamic
network topology in defending computer networks.
1.1 Motivation
Computer networks have become such an integral part in all aspects of our life today, en-
abling the rapid globalization of peoples and societies. They have changed the way we
communicate and share information, get local, national, and international news, entertain-
ment, run governments, manage economies, banking, and businesses, to the way we gather
intelligence and militaries wage war. With computer networks and the Internet, we have
seen the rise of entire industries that seemed inconceivable only a few decades ago, while
other industries are have been completely transformed.
It is difficult to imagine how we lived without these technological advances that computer
networks have brought to our lives and even more difficult to imagine how we could sur-
vive if these networks were brought down. As such, we continually study the various
aspects of computer networks and networking technologies in search for ways to improve
understanding, reliability and security of networks, and in turn develop new technologies
and techniques for constructing more efficient and secure systems. This work herein will
continue that endeavor, exploring developing technologies to evaluate their potential appli-
cation in better protecting computer networks.
1.1.1 Mapping
The Internet has become so complex that entire research groups have been formed with a
focus of conducting internet measurement [1], [2], and entire conferences dedicated to the
presentation and sharing of their research and findings [3]. To aid in this research, ever-
more intelligent and complex tools and methods are developed to perform measurements.
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One measurement goal is creating intelligent topological maps and visualization of the
Internet and computer networks. This activity comes from a wide range of actors on the
Internet beyond just reconnaissance and those conducting mapping in the name of harmless
research [4]. As computer networks continually come under more advanced methods of
probing and attack, we need to explore new and innovative ways to detect and counter these
infiltration and exploitation attempts. We will discuss in further detail network mapping in
§2.1, the methods and tools used for network mapping in §2.2, and ways that mapping
techniques can be deceived in §2.3.
1.1.2 OpenFlow
With the development of more advanced applications and mobile computing, to computer
and network virtualization, deployment of advanced security appliances like an Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), Network Firewalls, inte-
gration of intelligent Network Security Monitoring (NSM) solutions, and the rapid explo-
sion of cloud computing, much has changed in the computer industry. But all this growth
and change in years past has restricted network and security experts to implementation
of closed, vendor-specific solutions to best ensure interoperability across the enterprise.
Though significant work has been done in improving traffic management methods at the
lower layers of the Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) model, with more advanced routing
and switching protocols that span vendors, current network architectures are still limited
by technologies the equipment providers choose to support.
The emerging field of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [5] and the OpenFlow (OF) [6]
protocol are enabling the development of innovative network architectures and solutions
that are completely vendor agnostic and custom tailored for the information systems they
connect. International Data Corporation (IDC), a premier global market analysis firm, in
their published predictions for 2013 had estimated that the Software-Defined Networking
(SDN) market will reach $3.7 billion by the year 2016 and account for over 35 percent of
Ethernet switching in datacenters [7]. SDN has become so disruptive to the networking
industry in the past few years that most of the big named network equipment providers
are rapidly working to release OF-enabled products into the market, and in turn define and
promote their own vision for development of SDN solutions [5].
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The Open Networking Foundation (ONF), a user-driven organization dedicated to the pro-
motion and adoption of SDN, oversees the maintenance and development of the OF pro-
tocol standards, and maintains a dynamic list of vendors and products that support the
OF protocol [5]. The primitives of SDN and specifically the OF protocol, which we will
explore further in §3, as defined in an ONF White Paper [8], are:
1. Decoupling of the network switch management control plane from the data plane.
2. Centralized controller to manage one to many switches.
3. Ability to manage the behavior of the network using well-defined interfaces and stan-
dards based program.
4. Ability to manage devices across multiple vendor switches through non-proprietary
programmability.
1.2 Value to the Department of Defense
Open and democratic societies, such as the United States, are connected and dependent
on the free flow of information though computer networks for daily life and public safety.
And as such, they are critically vulnerable to the potential for disruption to the various
infrastructure upon with it operates. Therefore, it is of little surprise that issues in Cy-
berspace have quickly risen to the forefront of strategic thinking and policy in the last few
years. TheUnited States National Security Strategy [9], signed by the president in May
2010, highlights Securing Cyberspace as an important element in our strategic approach to
pursuing our four enduring national interest: Security, Prosperity, Values, and International
Order. Specifically with regard to security, the national strategy stated that “Cybersecu-
rity threats represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic
challenges we face as a nation.” It also recognizes cyber as a fifth domain by which the
military must continue to have capabilities to operate within in defense of the country and
our allies.
The DOD understands the strategic significance of protecting against cybersecurity threats
given the establishment of the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in 2009;
a sub-unified command under the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
General Keith Alexander, USA, as then Director of the National Security Agency (NSA),
became dual-hatted as the first commander of USCYBERCOM, whose mission would
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be focused on operation and defensive of networks within the .MIL domain. Given
that DOD networks are constantly being probed and scanned millions of times a day,
USCYBERCOM’s mission will be no small task [10].
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report [11], released in February 2010, by for-
mer Defense Secretary Robert Gates, highlights that U.S. deterrent capabilities remains
grounded in land, air, and naval forces, but that these forces are enabled by cyber and
space capabilities. The report also recognizes that the security environment requires cyber
defense capabilities and list several steps the DOD was taking to strengthen those capa-
bilities. Centralization of cyber operations under USCYBERCOM was one of these major
steps. Its establishment better positions the DOD to also address one of six identified mis-
sions from the QDR that the DOD must continue to focus on improving policy, doctrine,
and capabilities within; to “operate effectively in cyberspace.”
Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, like his predecessor Robert Gates, understood the
significant cybersecurity threat to the nation during his time in office. Panetta was quoted
towards the end of his tenure that “there is no question, in my mind, that part and parcel
of any attack on this country in the future, by any enemy, is going to include a cyber
element” [12]. Just after taking office in July 2011, Panetta released the Department of
Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace [10] in response to the 2010 QDR. This
report further described the departments’ reliance on computer networks, and it established
five strategic initiatives as a roadmap for the DOD:
1. Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that DOD
can take full advantage of cyberspace’s potential.
2. Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DOD networks and systems.
3. Partner with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private sector
to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy.
4. Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen
collective cybersecurity.
5. Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid
technological innovation.
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Taking further steps to enable the U.S. military to operate effectively in cyberspace, the
Joint Chiefs released JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations [13], in February 2013. Due
to the potential sensitivity of offensive and defensive operations in cyberspace, the publi-
cation was classified as SECRET and only available to cleared U.S. persons and specific
allied partners with proper need-to-know. Only weeks after the publication of JP 3-12, the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), James Clapper, presented the Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community [14] to the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence. He opened the brief on the increased global threat in cyber, highlighting several
recent cyber attacks of a nation-state acting against another and ongoing cyber espionage;
which if reported in the public domain are tracked by the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies in Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006 [15]. The director discussed
the growing concern to U.S. critical infrastructure and that a remote chance existed that an
attack could be waged against the U.S., not from advanced cyber actors such as Russia or
China, but more likely from an isolated, but capable, state or non-state actor.
The previous work on deceptive topology [16] we are building on here already spoke at
length regarding the history and use of mlitary deception and its application in cyberspace.
With the ever-growing complexity of computer networks, we have often taken a Defense-
in-Depth approach in which no one single control has proven sufficient to protect our infras-
tructure. The DNI also stated in his report that “in some cases, the world is applying digital
technologies faster than our ability to understand the security implications and mitigate po-
tential risks” [14]. Therefore, in support of the DOD’s five strategic initiatives as previously
stated, specifically “employing new defense operating concepts to protect DOD networks
and systems” and “leverage the nation’s ingenuity through rapid technology innovation,”
it is important that the department explore the potential of new ideas and technologies in
support of cyber defense and defense of this nation. Deploying a deceptive dynamic net-
work topology at the major DOD ingress points could further enhance the defense posture
of DOD networks from potential adversaries.
1.3 Summary of Contributions
Previous research [16] was conducted in employing various deceptive techniques, based on
the concepts of military deception, in preventing an adversary from successfully mapping
the true topology of the network. This work represents continuing research to present al-
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ternate methods to more optimality employ deceptive topology in real-world networks. We
will explore the growing field of SDN and specifically the OF protocol to suggest a proof-
of-concept enterprise solution to leveraging deceptive topology. Then we will demonstrate
that the primitives of the OF protocol provide a more agile approach to employing topology
deception through a custom-built SDN network controller. To validate the believability of
our deceptive topology solution, we will utilize several common network mapping tools to
probe our test network, running our custom-built controller, in attempts to generate a map
of the network topology. We then present our findings and discuss some limitations of the
current OF standard, and suggest possible changes to the OF protocol which could better
enable a more robust OF topology deceptive controller.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we will further explore
network mapping and the tools and techniques employed. In Chapter 3, we will explore
and in-depth background of the OF protocol. In Chapter 4, we discuss the details of the
topological deception implemented through the use of the OF protocol. In Chapter 5, we
will present the findings from our experimentation. Finally, in Chapter 6 we will provide




To understand the growing need to better secure computer networks and the desire to ob-
fuscate their topology, we must explore further the current efforts to map those networks,
and to what ends. We will discuss current research mapping methods comparatively with
efforts to map networks for exploitation. We will briefly review the underlying protocols
that support mapping and some of the available tools employed. We will then explore some
of the challenges in network mapping that can cause unintended representations of network
maps. Last, we will review some technologies that can disrupt network mapping efforts and
review previous work toward purposefully presenting a deceptive network topology.
2.1 Mapping
Computer networks are constantly being actively probed in the effort to generate a topolog-
ical map of their existence. A map of a networks’ topology is a depiction of the networks’
physical or logical structure. From a physical perspective, it shows the arrangement of var-
ious intermediate and endpoint nodes, such as routers, switches, proxies, firewalls, servers,
just to name a few, and how they are interconnected, or linked together. From a logical per-
spective, it shows how data and information flows in and through the network, regardless of
its physical structure. This reconnaissance traffic to build topological maps emanates from
many sources to include research groups and curious learners, to more nefarious purposes
from a wide range of hacker activity, from the simple script kiddie, to more experienced
criminal hackers, and the nation-state Advanced Persistent Threat (APT).
2.1.1 Mapping for Research
The Internet as we know it today began as the Advanced Research Project Agency Network
(ARPANET), a research project in studying packet switched networks in the 1960s funded
by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). It was an attempt to develop
a replacement to circuit-switched networks for the movement and sharing of data, with
many of the first nodes located at some of the major universities for which the DOD funded
various other research. One of the key underlying technical ideas that live on in the Internet
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of today was open architecture networking. In its early years, the Internet was mostly
available to research organizations and universities, but began rapid expansion in the 1990s
with the privatization of providers and commercialization of network products [17].
The growth of the Internet over the last two decades has exploded: hundreds of countries are
connected and over 34 percent of the world’s population is now online [18]. The Internet,
being a network of networks, is now quite complex and constantly changing and evolving
by the minute, with individual nodes to entire networks coming online or going offline, or
even moving between networks. Understanding the Internet’s states and reason for changes
is certainly of interest to the research community, and the various public and private groups
that fund their research.
Much of the Internet at its core is generally constructed through interconnections, or peer-
ing, between major communications providers, or tier 1 Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
Since these major providers typically do not pay each other for the peering connection, it
is cost advantageous for a tier 1 provider to hand off traffic that is not destined to a node
or network within its own network, to another tier 1 provider’s network. Therefore, it is
interesting to understand, through network mapping, how and where these major providers
establish peering, and how they route traffic between themselves. These tier 1 ISPs usually
connect smaller tier 2 and tier 3 ISPs, who in turn connect public and private customer
networks through customer-provider links. In customer-provider links, the customer pays
the provider for the connection, be it a public or private network to an ISP, or a higher
tier ISP to a lower-tier ISP. Interestingly, we are learning through network mapping, that
more and more upper tier providers and major public and private networks are establishing
mutual peering between themselves, lowering their cost by taking out the middle man: the
lower-tier ISPs [19].
In the United States, we believe in the right to free speech as established by our Consti-
tution. This extends as well to our activities on the Internet where we enjoy the idea of
openness and the unrestricted sharing of ideas and information. However, in some non-
democratic nation-states, governments may seek to restrict or completely block Internet
access to its citizens. A primary example is China’s Great Firewall [20] or Iran’s attempts
to build a national Internet [21], or various nations’ attempts to close and limit Internet
access during the Arab Spring in 2011, as was done in Egypt and Libya [22]. Such con-
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ditions of governmental restriction and political unrest, where the people have some form
of network technology or the Internet by which to communicate, coordinate, and virtually
assemble, will naturally be an area of interest for researchers of more democratic nations.
The Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) is an organization dedi-
cated to “investigating practical and theoretical aspects of the Internet” and “provide macro-
scopic insights into Internet infrastructure, behavior, usage, and evolution” [1]. At the
heart of supporting this measurement research is the Archipelago Measurement Infrastruc-
ture [23], or Ark, with approximately 80 monitors deployed worldwide in the beginning
of 2014. This distributed measurement architecture provides researchers the ability to per-
form various on-demand topology measurements from geographically distributed vantage
points on the Internet. CAIDA makes their data freely and publicly available to researchers
for download, performing anonymization of the data when necessary.
Another large research project in building Internet measurement infrastructure is from the
Reseaux IP Europeans Network Coordination Center (RIPE NCC) [24]; one of the five Re-
gional Internet Registriess (RIRs) that provide Internet resource allocations and registration
services worldwide. RIPE NCC is the RIR for Europe, but also covers the Middle East and
Central Asia. The RIPE Atlas [25] project consists of over 4700 probes as of early 2014
and aims to be the largest Internet measurement infrastructure. The vantage point nodes
are a tiny hardware device, about the size of an external Universal Serial Bus (USB) hub,
deployed on an Internet connected Local Area Network (LAN) and capable of perform-
ing measurements such as connectivity and reachability tests. Of the currently deployed
probes, the largest percentage of total probes, over 12 percent, are hosted in the United
States. Vice coordinating partnered deployment of hosts at various sites around the world
as done with CAIDA’s Ark, RIPE Atlas probes are requested by users interested in Internet
performance and are frequently hosted on their home Internet connections. The specific
measurement toolset installed on each probe is configured and controlled by RIPE NCC,
which restricts the scope and type of scans that can be performed.
A global research project more attuned to providing a platform for testing large-scale dis-
tributed network services is PlanetLab [26]. With 1175 nodes at 564 sites worldwide as
of the beginning of 2014, PlanetLab presents researchers with a unique ability to test new
technologies in a real world environment. Like CAIDA, most of the PlanetLab nodes are
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hosted at research institutions, with some co-located at major network routing centers. All
nodes run a common Linux operating system, with additional support software, to enable
researchers to get a “slice” of one or more nodes for experimentation. In this fashion, Plan-
etLab is able to support many different experiments running side-by-side on the nodes, but
in isolation of one another. Where CAIDA’s Ark and RIPE Atlas are in different ways
restricted in the employment of their nodes, researchers can build a customized network
measurement scanner, upload it to their PlanetLab slices, and have complete control to ma-
nipulate the tool and perform probes and scans. However, individuals cannot just go online
and request slices in PlanetLab, upload some custom-developed scanner, and start scan-
ning the Internet. To use PlanetLab, and individual must be associated with an academic,
industrial, or government institution that is a member of the PlanetLab Consortium.
The three projects mentioned, CAIDA’s Ark, RIPE Atlas, and PlanetLab slices, all to dif-
ferent degrees, with different requirements and restrictions, enable measurement of inter-
mediate nodes (routers, proxies, etc.), down to end point nodes (hosts, servers), in building
topological maps. There are certainly others conducting various topology mapping projects
to discover nodes and endpoints through networks, but some mapping projects are focused
just on mapping the end points themselves. One such project was the Ant Censuses of
the Internet Address Space [27], a project by researchers at the Information Sciences In-
stitute (ISI), a unit of University of Southern California (USC), which focused only on
discovering and mapping end hosts in efforts to determine the density of the Internet Proto-
col version 4 (IPv4) address space. In this project, the researchers probed for the presence
of each individual Internet Protocol (IP) address in the entire IPv4 address space, recording
the results of which hosts directly responded, were reported as unreachable, or simply did
not respond at all. These early measurements were conducted over a four-year period from
2003 to 2007 [28]. Continued work under the Ant project from 2007 to 2011, employed
additional methods of constructing two-dimensional color coded maps of the results, which
allowed users to drill down into subsets of the IP space [27].
Another less-sanctioned “Internet Census” was performed by unnamed researcher(s) in
2012, called the Carna Botnet [29]. In this work, they searched the Internet IPv4 address
range for network devices with a few default logon credentials, such as root:root, or ad-
min:admin. From the list of discovered devices, they determined which ones would accept
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a small payload, which supposedly would not impede the primary functions of the host,
and installed a custom scanner to run at a low level priority. The researchers claimed to
have had at most 420,000 devices running in their botnet, by which they performed vari-
ous probes and scans of the Internet. From the results, the researchers constructed a two-
dimensional map of the IPv4 address space, along with other generated statistics, similar
to that performed by the Ant Census project.
As we have shown, there is an extensive and diverse amount of activity performed on the
Internet in efforts to build topology and end-point maps of networks for various research
projects. There are many more curious individuals with an Internet connection and a desire
to learn performing probes and scans across the IP address space as well, all in an effort
to improve their own individual knowledge. When considering that DOD networks are
reportedly probed millions of times a day, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish
whether this probing activity is simply for research and not for nefarious purposes.
2.1.2 Mapping for Exploitation
Hacking and exploiting a system is generally the act of gaining unauthorized access to
some computer system and exploiting it for your own purposes. Though this could again
be just the curious learner who has crossed the line of legality, knowingly or unknowingly.
The purpose could also be much more nefarious in nature to the point of criminal behavior,
or worse, depending on the actions and actual intent of those who gained the access into a
system.
Hackers are generally classified as either a White Hat or a Black Hat, though many may
operate somewhere between these classifications [30]. We generally consider a White Hat
hacker to be a security experts who are hired to perform authorized penetration testing of
a network to uncover vulnerabilities and exploit them, then report their findings based on
the signed Penetration Agreement with the organization for which they were authorized.
This is more in tune to the original definition of what it was meant to be a hacker. On
the contrary, a Black Hat hacker is one who also uncovers vulnerabilities and exploits
them, but lacks authorization to do so, fails to inform the network or system owner of the
vulnerability, and may even take steps to share the information with other Black Hats. The
actions of a Black Hat are what people have more generally come to associate with the
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term hacker and hacking today; the malicious hacker or cracker. Both of these “hackers,”
White Hats and Black Hats, require similar skill sets and use many of the same tools to
perform their actions of hacking and exploiting: the clear distinction is the purpose and
intent behind the acts.
Whether it is a White Hat or a Black Hat attempting to discover vulnerabilities and exploit
them, the general methodology [31] each follows is the same. The initial steps in the pro-
cess are commonly referred to as footprinting and scanning, though footprinting can also
involve some forms of scanning. Anyone who was going to plan a robbery with the intent
of minimizing the chances of getting caught, would generally attempt to find out as much
as they could about the target, such as entry and exit points, security controls and systems,
and many other relevant attributes about the place. A similar process is applied in attempt-
ing to gain unauthorized access to a computer network. There is a plethora of passive data
collection that must first be conducted by reviewing publicly available information to con-
struct a profile of the organization’s Internet presence. This information can be obtained
from the target organization’s websites and by reviewing publicly accessible RIR informa-
tion. Through these resources we can learn the organization’s structure, partners, as well as
domain names, IP network blocks, other public facing Internet services and their associated
IP addresses, to include information about their security posture.
Armed with the information gained from passive footprinting a target, specifically now a
list of IP addresses and network blocks to focus attention to, the steps of active footprint-
ing and scanning are performed. At this point, the goal is to probe the list of addresses to
discover network routers, servers, and other intermediate and end point nodes within the
target network. Essentially, to develop a general topological map of the network, its links,
and discover weaknesses to exploit. The goal of the hacker could be to perform a Denial
of Service (DoS), by taking down a critical node or link, or exploit a node to gain further
access into the network. If an adversary conducting the probes and scans is somewhat cau-
tious and methodical in their approach to active footprinting and scanning, from a network
defense perspective, the traffic may not look much different than the type of traffic seen
from activities discussed in §2.1.1 on research mapping.
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2.2 Mapping Tools
The foundation that supports the various methods of network mapping, whether for re-
search, network troubleshooting, or more nefarious purposes, is the inherent protocols
within the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) [32] suite. The
TCP/IP protocol suite is the defacto standard required to be run by any computer to partic-
ipate in communications within a computer network, whether a small LAN or the Internet.
We will discuss briefly some of these protocols, how they work, then discuss some of the
various tools that utilize features of these protocols.
2.2.1 Internet Control Message Protocol
Sending messages between computers is handled by the IP portion of TCP/IP; however,
there are various ways in which errors in the communication between host can occur. This
is in part because IP contains no method to ensure reliable communication between host as
this is left to upper and lower layers of TCP/IP, whether end-to-end or host-to-host com-
munication. The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) [33] is an integrated part of IP
to communicate various error messages between hosts regarding the delivery of individual
datagrams. An ICMP message is generated based on the error condition observed by a
network router or individual host computer. One of the most common situations in which
an ICMP message may be generated is when a datagram cannot reach its destination. The
error message is packaged as the payload within an IP datagram.
An ICMP message contains as a basic header to differentiate various error messages, a
Type and Code field, along with a calculated checksum. Some ICMP message Types have
various associated Codes to further describe the error type, while other Types do not use
a Code value. As mentioned, one of the most common situations in the generation of an
ICMP error message is when a datagram cannot reach its destination, which is a Type
3 “Destination Unreachable” message. A Type 3 message has fourteen different options
for the associated Code to further articulate the specific reason why the destination was
unreachable. Some of these Codes are specifically generated from a router, such as Code 1
for Host Unreachable, and some specifically generated by a host computer, such as Code 3
for Port Unreachable. There are several other common ICMP Types exploited by many of
the various probing and scanning tools: Type 8 for Echo, Type 0 for Echo Reply, and Type
11 for Time Exceeded.
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2.2.2 Transport Protocols
The primary purpose of TCP/IP, however, is not to move ICMP error messages around, but
instead to move, or transport, various types of data packets between computers in a network
or across the Internet. These various data packets can be simple data files, electronic mail,
to streaming audio or video. As such, there are two transport protocols that sit on top of IP
to control the movement of data between two computers: Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [32]. Each has its pros and cons, but overall
each is designed to move information from a program on one computer to a program on
another computer. Each program, such as an email server or a web server, communicates
through a port number, which separates one service from another service running on a
computer. Both TCP and UDP make use of port numbers in the transport header, a separate
216 value field for source port and for destination port, which can range from zero to 65535.
Some common, or well known, port numbers are 25 for a Mail Server and 80 for a web
server. Some network scanning tools make use of specially crafting TCP and UDP packets
in order to conduct probing and scanning as legitimate network services also make use of
these protocols and ports.
Transmission Control Protocol
TCP is a connection-oriented transport protocol for end-to-end data communications. It
is connection-oriented in that it uses Flags in the header to establish, manage, and tare
down sessions between two communicating computers in a controlled fashion. It also uses
sequencing and acknowledgment fields in the header to control and guarantee delivery of
each and every transmitted packet and employs methods to resend packets that fail to reach
the far end. As well, it employs various windowing and options to control the flow of
information. TCP is typically employed where precise reconstruction of information from
one end to the other is required, as is the case with moving a data file from one location to
another.
User Datagram Protocol
UDP is a connectionless transport protocol for end-to-end data communications. It is con-
nectionless in that it minimizes overhead and speeds processing of packets to the end host
by sacrificing the use of end-to-end delivery guarantees that TCP utilizes. As such, UDP
does not contain sequencing, acknowledgment, flags, windowing, or options fields in the
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header as does TCP. UDP is typically employed where precise reconstruction of informa-
tion from one end to the other is not required and some loss is acceptable, such as streaming
audio or video. Otherwise, UDP leaves it up to the application to decide how to handle lost
packets, such is typical done with Domain Name System (DNS) queries.
2.2.3 PING Utilities
PING [34] is a network probing utility to perform network diagnostics by querying a re-
mote host to determine if that host is alive and communicating on the network. The utility
makes use of particular ICMP message Types as discussed in §2.2.1. To probe a host,
PING constructs an ICMP Echo message with Type 8, Code 0 set, as well as an identifier
and sequence number field of the ICMP header, and addresses it to a particular destination
IP address as indicated in the IP header portion of the packet. If the destination host re-
ceives the Echo message, it would normally construct an ICMP Echo Reply message with
Type 0, Code 0 set in the ICMP header, and address it back to the host that sent the Echo
message. PING calculates a Round-trip Time (RTT) for each probe message, which is the
time difference between when a particular probe was sent and when its associated reply
was received. Much of this RTT is due to inherent propagation delay as the Echo packet
is transmitted along some medium to the target and the Echo reply packet is transmitted
back along that medium to the source. However, other factors can affect the RTT by further
causing delays in packets or even packet loss. PING uses the identifier and sequence num-
ber of each probe packet as a unique signature to associate reply messages. If, for whatever
reason, along the network path the Echo message cannot be delivered to the destination
address, the last node to receive the Echo message may generate a destination unreachable,
Type 3, with the appropriate Code set, and address it back to the source as identified in the
original Echo message. As well, it is possible that a particular probe may never receive a
reply, which then results in packet loss.
In the example demonstrated in Figure 2.1, we sent four probe messages to an IP address of
172.20.5.2, and in this case received a reply to each probe. Each line of “64 bytes from...”
represents a reply to an individual probe and includes the calculated RTT for each probe. In
the ping statistics, we are presented the details of probes sent and responses received, and
the calculated packet loss. Since we received an Echo reply to each Echo probe message,
our calculated packet loss is zero. The statistics also present some valuable information
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with regard to overall RTTs to include the minimum, average, and maximum return times.
The last value in the RTT statistics line is the calculated mdev, also known as the Moving
Standard Deviation (MSTD), which is an average of how far each ping RTT is from the
mean RTT. The higher the mdev, the more variable the RTTs are over time. Though it is
unlikely that the mdev would be zero, the lower the mdev number the better. These latency
calculations can be extremely useful in topology mapping through various latency-based
geolocation methods [35], [36], [37].
PING 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ) 5 6 ( 8 4 ) b y t e s o f d a t a .
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =1 t t l =59 t ime =104 ms
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =2 t t l =59 t ime =105 ms
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =3 t t l =59 t ime =101 ms
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =4 t t l =59 t ime =100 ms
−−− 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 p ing s t a t i s t i c s −−−
4 p a c k e t s t r a n s m i t t e d , 4 r e c e i v e d , 0 % p a c k e t l o s s , t ime 3004ms
r t t min / avg / max / mdev = 1 0 0 . 4 0 3 / 1 0 3 . 0 1 9 / 1 0 5 . 1 0 2 / 2 . 0 7 2 ms
Figure 2.1: Demonstration of successful PING to remote host.
The basic PING utility first developed in the 1980s employed ICMP and was initially in-
stalled on Berkley Unix operating system. Some of the natively installed PING utilities
embedded in operating systems are restricted in their functionality and do not offer a wide
range of options, nor do they integrate well with custom scripts. One major limitation is the
lack of ability to ping more than one IP address simultaneously, for which the Fping [38]
utility was developed. Fping provides various methods to specify and ping multiple hosts
at the same time, while also providing improved scripting functionality for integration into
custom applications.
Some Internet routers may not respond to an ICMP Echo message if the owners of that
router strictly implements Request For Comments (RFC) 792 for ICMP, in that “no ICMP
messages are sent about ICMP messages” [33]. However, RFC 1122 [39] later provided
clarification on specific ICMP Types and situations in which a router should and should
not respond to various ICMP messages, and it specifically stated that routers are to send
Type 11 Time Exceeded messages in response to Type 8 Echo messages. On the other
hand, network security personnel over the years have implemented controls to block ICMP
into private networks per various security best practices. As an example, The 60 Minute
Network Security Guide [40] published by the NSA, recommends restricting certain ICMP
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message Types. Specifically, it recommend only allowing the following ICMP Types into
a private network: 0 - Echo Reply, 3 - Destination unreachable, 4 - Source Quench, 11 -
Time Exceeded, and 12 - Parameter problem; all of which would normally be triggered
and generated by traffic that originates from internal of the private network. Additionally,
it recommend only allowing the following Types out of a private network: 4 - Source
Quench, 8 - Echo Request (PING), and 12 - Parameter Problem; all of which supports
troubleshooting from internal of the network. The other ICMP Types from the RFC not
specifically allowed, should be blocked. The implementation of such network security best
practices, of blocking ICMP at a private networks’ border router, can cause ICMP based
pings and traceroutes to fail.
Given these practices of restricting ICMP traffic, other popular ping utilities were devel-
oped to overcome these security controls. One popular utility is Hping [41], which allows
probing a host not only with ICMP, but also using common communication transport pro-
tocol messages described in §2.2.2. Using Hping to conduct a UDP or TCP probe for a
host on a commonly open public facing port, may allow discovery of nodes that otherwise
would not be discoverable with an ICMP probe. Another utility that started as a “Google
Summer of Code” Project in 2009 is Nping [42], which allows full control over protocol
headers for network penetration and stress testing. A unique feature of Nping is an “Echo
mode” for advanced troubleshooting and discovery so users can see how packets change in
transit without the use of packet capture utilities for in-depth packet comparison.
2.2.4 Traceroute Utilities
Traceroute is a network probing utility designed for network diagnostics to determine the
route, or hops, along a network or the Internet, to a destination node. That destination node
can be a router port, end host computer, or some other networking device on the network.
It works somewhat the same as the various PING utilities mentioned in §2.2.3, in that it
records associated return packets and calculates a RTT, but traceroute also manipulates the
Time-to-Live (TTL) field of an IP header for each probe. The IP header of a packet includes
a TTL value to prevent packets from looping endlessly on a network or the Internet. When a
network router receives an incoming packet on its interface, it will first inspect the packets’
TTL, and if that value is a 1 or 0, the router will drop the packet and construct an ICMP
Type 11, Code 0, Time Exceeded / TTL Exceeded in Transit message, and send it back to
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the source of the dropped packet. Typically the source address of the router generated Type
11 message will be the address assigned to the router ingress port that received the packet,
which in turn allows traceroute to reconstruct a forward interface-level path to the target.
This is contrary to the seldom supported “Record Route” option of the PING utility, which
records the egress, or outbound port, of each router along the path to the target as discussed
in RFC 791 [43].
When running most traceroute utilities [44], it will by default send three probes at each TTL
increment, starting with a TTL value of 1. In other words, three packets with a TTL value of
1 will be sent before the probing computer increments the TTL by 1 for the next set of three
probes, this time with a TTL of 2. With each individual probe message, traceroute will also
increment the Identification number in the IP header and the Sequence number in the ICMP
header, which uniquely identifies each probe message. As increasing TTL probes are sent,
their packets TTL will be decremented by the routers along the path to the target, by which
the prober will receive associated Time Exceeded messages and infer a forward path to the
target. The traceroute utility will continue to send each set of probes until a response is
received by the destination target or the maximum number of hops to measure is reached.
Not all traceroute utilities exactly follow this method as path anomalies, discussed further
in §2.3.1, can arise when probing across certain types of network architectures, by which
alternate utilities and methods are used to overcome these anomalies.
An example of a successful ICMP traceroute is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Here we see each
output line starts with the tested TTL value in succession until the destination was reached.
Each line lists the IP address of the returned probe at that TTL value, along with the cal-
culated RTT of the individual probes at that TTL. The default for most traceroute utilities
again is three probes per TTL, hence why three different RTTs are listed per TTL. We can
also see that, by default, the traceroute utility will only record up to 30 hops max towards
the target before giving up. Some utilities may employ a gap limit, stopping the probe after
a certain number of failed replies in succession, and hence not reach the maximum hop
limit. Utilities that employ gap limits will typically allow options to modify the gap limit
of a trace.
The first traceroute program used ICMP to perform the probe messages, however, ven-
dor interpretations of various early RFCs on how to handle ICMP traffic, as mentioned in
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t r a c e r o u t e t o 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ) , 30 hops max , 60 b y t e p a c k e t s
1 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 4 .162 ms 10 .003 ms 11 .687 ms
2 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 32 .017 ms 38 .620 ms 32 .175 ms
3 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 2 . 2 52 .555 ms 51 .489 ms 55 .265 ms
4 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 3 . 2 70 .271 ms 77 .426 ms 73 .474 ms
5 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 4 . 2 92 .828 ms 92 .867 ms 91 .616 ms
6 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 112 .653 ms 102 .199 ms 106 .639 ms
Figure 2.2: Demonstration of successful ICMP traceroute to remote host.
§2.2.3, caused erratic performance with this method. As such, researchers sought alternate
methods, such as sending UDP probes with incremental TTL values, to solicit Time Ex-
ceeded messages from network routers along the path to the target. Since this method is
employing a transport protocol typically used for normal network traffic, a port number as
discussed in §2.2.2 must be assigned. The original implementation developed by Van Ja-
cobson and still in use today, employs UDP ports 33434 through 33534, which was a high
enough port that at the time no hosts would be using. Since this method directs traffic to a
port that no host is expected to be listening on, the traceroute expects to receive a different
type of ICMP reply message than that from an ICMP traceroute. Specifically, the end host
should reply with an Type 3, Code 3, Destination Unreachable / Port Unreachable ICMP
message [44].
Like the PING utility, the traceroute utility is embedded in practically all operating systems
today, however, their default behavior differs by operating system. Specifically, Windows
operating systems employ the ICMP traceroute method, while versions of the Linux and
Unix operating systems employ the UDP traceroute method. In all other aspects, the util-
ities are somewhat basic with limited selectable options; though many Linux flavors will
include additional options for conducting ICMP and even TCP traces [44]. There are many
other third party traceroute utilities, such as the popular paris-traceroute utility [45], that
employs various methods of tweaking header information in ICMP, UDP and TCP traces
to more accurately map a network path.
2.2.5 Other Mapping Utilities
There is an ever-growing list of free and open-source software (FOSS) utilities that allow
users to define customized network probes and scans [46]. One of the most popular is
Nmap (Network Mapper) [47], a utility for network discovery and security auditing. It
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is a network mapping utility in that it can perform various methods of network pings and
traceroutes to build a topological map of a network, but also performs as a scanning utility
in probing port numbers on hosts to assess the type and version of services running, and to
fingerprint the operating system.
2.3 Mapping Deception
Generating accurate topological network maps can be a complex process, with many differ-
ent methods of measuring employed, each with an array of different tools, all in attempts
to determine ground truth, though we continue to get different results [48]. The design
and complexity of the Internet alone can lead to false or ambiguous representations of a
network route. As well, there is an assortment of network technologies whose sole purpose
is to provide deceptive representations of network services.
2.3.1 Unintentional Deception
The scale of the Internet has grown to a global network of networks beyond what early
developers could possibly have ever imagined. Defined by thousands of RFCs and hundreds
of networking protocols and standards, all left to be interpreted by those who develop and
implement networking equipment and solutions to ensure interoperability, at best, there
are bound to be difficult to interpret probing anomalies. Even the many tools available to
perform measurements are imperfect and limited in their ability to accurately represent the
true network state at the point of observation.
Previous research [49] compared the results of probes from different vantages points across
the Internet, using various utility methods and comparing the results. They found that dif-
ferent probe types, ICMP, UDP and TCP, often presented a different topology representa-
tion of the probed network. The anomalies between methods could be the result of certain
UDP or TCP port traffic being blocked by some routers, or even the common practice of
just blocking ICMP traffic. Failure to get some responses could simply be certain routers
configured to not provide error messages for dropped packets, or the router operating at
such a high utility that ICMP error messages are not generated. Given that UDP is a non-
reliable protocol, it is possible that a UDP probe packet was simply lost along the way to
the destination. As well, some routers may put a lower priority on processing ICMP traffic,
that the ICMP probe or the response to a probe is dropped by routers operating over partic-
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ular thresholds. Since ping and traceroute utilities will only listen for a short duration for a
probe reply, it is possible that delay queuing and processing of ICMP messages by routers,
could cause delay of a probe reply message such that it arrives after the listening period has
expired.
Some of the most common sources of anomalies in network measurement is the use of
load-balancing routers and optimal path packet routing. With load-balancing routers, more
than one path between sets of routers are used and traffic flows are broken up between these
paths. With optimal path packet routing, a response packet could take an alternate route
back to the source, as was discussed in §2.1.1. Eliminating the load-balancing anomaly
when conducting network traces, is the primary purpose behind the development of Paris-
traceroute [45]. The developers of paris-traceroute highlight several methods commonly
employed in load-balancing network traffic, each causing different effects with ICMP, UDP
and TCP traffic flows, and hence different results with different probing methods. By ex-
ploring the various methods in which network load balancing in employed and configured,
the developers slightly modified the way in which the probe packet header fields are con-
structed in paris-traceroute. This change allows all probes towards a target to follow the
same path in per-flow load balancing, but still in a fashion to distinguish each probe packet
to properly associate its reply message. Though paris-traceroute overcomes anomalies from
per-flow load balancing, challenges can still be present with per-packet load balancing.
There is an ever-growing array of network security tools, applications, and appliances de-
signed to protect networks from undesirable traffic. These protection methods can prevent
or minimize an adversary’s ability to probe and map a networks’ topology, and though
they are not specifically designed with the purpose of deception, they are worth briefly
mentioning here. One of the most basic of network security controls is to filter out unde-
sirable traffic from entering a private network. The most common method to employ traffic
filtering is to utilize a feature inherent with most network routers, that of Access Control
Lists (ACLs). These are simple rules that packet headers are checked against as they enter a
router, where the packet is either allowed or denied through based on the specific ACL rules
defined. These rules can filter traffic on source and destination IP address, network proto-
col, source and destination port number, as well as filter traffic based on already established
TCP connections and the direction the packet is traveling through the network. ACLs are
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most common method of filtering ICMP as discussed in §2.2.3, and primary employed at
the network edge.
Router ACLs do have their limits with traffic filtering as the primary purpose of a router
is to move traffic between networks. Firewalls on the other hand are designed specifically
for advanced traffic filtering, are either software based for installation on a specific host,
or hardware based and installed as a network appliance. Firewalls can control and filter
traffic by the same criteria as ACLs, but are capable of preforming much more fine-grained
packet inspection and offer much greater logging controls. Both ACLs and Firewalls, when
properly employed, can impose challenges to those attempting to probe networks for topol-
ogy mapping. However, these are primarily static controls and mostly allow or deny traffic
based on the pre-configured policy. An IPS can go even further in providing some reactive
filtering on a network by monitoring traffic based on a defined policy, and actually con-
trol and prevent specific traffic flows to include generation of connection resets to network
sessions and probe packets. Again, these security controls are not specifically purposed to
intentionally provide deception, they can impact network topology mapping efforts. There,
however, other services that are specifically purposed to present deception in a network.
2.3.2 Intentional Deception
There is a category of tools that are designed specifically to present deceptive services
on a network. Their purpose is to lure a potential adversary away from primary network
resources and learn their Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduress (TTPs). As well, we are ex-
ploring additional methods to further present an adversary with a deceptive representation
of the network that can build on or even enhance current deceptive technologies.
Honeypots are security tools specifically intended for deception on a network as they repre-
sent a false service, computer server, or entire network. They are deployed in live networks
to intentionally draw in an adversary away from actual network services, enticing them
to probe, scan, and even attempt to exploit the faked services with the purpose of learn-
ing their TTPs. Honeypots generally fall into one of two categories, low-interaction or
high-interaction. The low-interaction honeypots typically are virtual machines designed
to present a small set of basic services that an adversary may seek to exploit, and usually
hidden enough that a casual user would not happen upon them. On the other hand, high-
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interaction honeypots can scale to representing an entire network with extensive services
offered and providing a rich depth of interaction to a potential adversary. Though these
services can also be deployed as virtual machines, they may span multiple servers and
provide extensive security to ensure the adversary remains fully isolated in the honeypot
services. Some of the most prevalent groups conducting work in this area are The Honeynet
Project [50] and Project Honey Pot [51], with many different open-source and proprietary
solutions that can be implemented in a network to deceive attackers.
Though honeypots are primary focused on presenting false end-point services, none extend
to providing deceptive routes to those honeypots, or even deceptive routes to actual net-
work resources. Hence was the focus of some recent research [16] in designing a technique
for presenting a deceptive dynamic network topology to anyone attempting to probe a net-
work to construct a topological map of that network. The general research thought was
that we can simply filter such adversarial traffic using some of the various network security
methods previously discussed. However, the argument was also that given such blocking
methods, it was questionable whether we truly prevent the network from being probed by
an adversary with blocking means alone. The methodology implemented in this deceptive
dynamic network topology, employed a bump-in-the-wire, multi-homed, customized ker-
nel Linux computer that inspected all traffic destined to an internal network server. If that
traffic matched packet header fields characteristic of network probing based on the defined
policy, a customized response would be sent back to the source of the probe to essentially
paint a false topology of the network leading to that host. By properly choosing a deceptive
topology to falsely represent to probes in the networks, we can make the network appear
weak where it is strong and strong where it is weak. While the concepts are sound and
the results were promising in representing a proof-of-concept solution, it is questionable
whether such a solution could scale well in an enterprise network environment, and hence
the purpose of this continued research in exploring the premises of SDN and the OF pro-
tocol in constructing a more agile solution for employing a dynamic deceptive network
topology.
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CHAPTER 3:
SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKING AND THE
OPENFLOW PROTOCOL
The field of SDN and the OF protocol, as briefly presented in §1.1.2, are completely chang-
ing the way we can design and manage networks architectures. From an application per-
spective, the network was simply the plumbing that ensured data and information moved
from one point to another, with no real knowledge of how the plumbing performed its func-
tions. SDN and the OF protocol allows network engineers the ability to now innovate in
the wiring closet, deploying networks that are specifically built for the information envi-
ronment they support and allowing those applications to gain intelligence of the underlying
network.
In this chapter, we will discuss the origins of the OF protocol, and its relation to SDN. We
will then discuss the types and purpose of OF controllers, and review the salient features of
the OF standard and provide relevant details on its operation.
3.1 The Origins of OpenFlow
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact origins of the OF protocol, but several projects in suc-
cession have paved the way to its initial development. The initial concepts of separately
dividing network functions into architectural planes seems to be rooted in a paper that pro-
posed a “clean-slate” approach in redesigning the control and management functions in
networking equipment from the ground up. The architectural design was called “4D” [52]
based on the idea that four distinct and separate planes existed in networking equipment:
decision, dissemination, discovery, and data.
An early project by some of the creators of OF was The Virtual Network System (VNS) [53],
a hands-on networking environment in which students could generate and work with sensi-
tive raw network traffic in their efforts to learn the many aspects of Internet infrastructure.
Though methods existed to facilitate this learning, it was limited in that students could
not interface actual equipment with the Internet to work with real-world traffic. Acquir-
25
ing hands-on learning then required use of limited special-purpose simulation programs
with non-standard controls, or extensive networking labs using dedicated hardware, which
took many hours to configure. As the name implies, VNS allowed students to easily con-
struct virtual networks in a protected topology and process real Internet traffic. Being a
virtualized environment, students could connect remotely from anywhere on the Internet to
participate in various projects.
A later project in 2006, Secure Architecture for the Networked Enterprise (SANE) [54],
of which the creators of VNS were also a part, sought to address the limited flexibility of
managing and controlling networks with current complex network appliances and security
mechanisms. The idea was to implement a protection layer that spanned across all enter-
prise equipment to control all routing and access decisions throughout the enterprise. This
layer would reside between the Ethernet and IP layers of TCP/IP. The enterprise policy
would be managed from a logically centralized server to define capabilities for commu-
nication within the enterprise. SANE’s architecture was constructed around the following
design goals: allow natural policies that are simple yet powerful, enforcement should be at
the link layer, to prevent lower layers from undermining it, hide information about topol-
ogy and services from those without permission to see them, and have only one trusted
component. The initial prototype for SANE was constructed within VNS.
Building on the conceptual successes from SANE, the same creators went on to support a
project in 2007 entitled Ethane [55]. Where SANE sought to add an additional layer in the
network stack on all hosts and routers to control enterprise communication, it only managed
to hide the complexity of the network, vice reduce it. Ethane maintained the concepts of
enterprise communications management through a centralized controller, but introduces
the use of simplified flow-based Ethernet switches by which the communications policy
throughout the enterprise can be managed. It was considered simplified in that an Ethane
switch does not need to perform common layer 2 switch functions of learning Media Access
Control (MAC) addresses, or supporting Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs), nor upper
layer 3 and 4 functionality either. Three fundamental principles that defined Ethane were:
the network should be governed by policies declared over high-level names, the policy
should determine the path that packets follow, and the network should enforce a strong
binding between a packet and its origin. Ethane was constructed at Stanford University
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and connected several hundred registered hosts with several hundred users. As vendor
switches mostly allowed only the use of proprietary firmware, the wired Ethane switches
were constructed from NetFPGA [56] programmable cards and software switches built
upon the Linux operating system. The only modified vendor switches used in Ethane were a
common brand name, home office wireless access point, running a FOSS Linux distribution
for embedded devices.
Drawing much from previous work conducted with Ethane, OpenFlow [57] was first pre-
sented as a white paper in early 2008 as a way for researchers to run experimental pro-
tocols in an isolated environment, but using portions of the existing Campus Area Net-
work (CAN). The targeting of campus networks for implementation of OF was part of the
continuing push for “clean-slate” network architecture research presented by the 4D paper
in 2004. OF enabled this environment to be built upon existing campus network infras-
tructure already deployed and in use by everyday users. The general idea was to partition
network switches and routers into production and research flows by physical network port,
allowing the network device to manage flows for production traffic on the campus network
assigned ports and OF to program the flow-tables for ports assigned for research. These
dedicated OF switches consists of three parts: a flow-table on the switch that contained
match criteria for flows and specified an associated action for each flow, a secure channel
to interface the switch with a controller, and the OF protocol itself. Therefore, the OF
protocol provides the communication between a controller and one or more OF switches
for setting flow policy within the network. The initial specification consisted of a 10-tuple
for packet header fields by which flows could be distinguished and matches conducted, as
further detailed in § 3.4.
Though initially licensed by Stanford University, an OpenFlow Consortium was estab-
lished with the sole purpose to maintain and grow the OF specification within the research
community. The consortium established a public website (www.openflowswitch.org) to
publicize the OF standard and foster community growth of the standard; later changed
to www.openflow.org [6]. The consortium continued to develop the OF standard while
working with several industry switch manufacturers in their creation of OF-enabled vendor
switches. Given the growing interest and development in OF from the networking industry,
the Open Networking Foundation (ONF ) [5] was established in 2011 to promote adoption
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of SDN through open standards development. With its establishment, the ONF took over
management of the OF standards, transitioning the standard to enable product commer-
cialization. In its first year established, the ONF had over fifty member companies. The
foundation now consists of over 100 member companies in early 2014, with thirteen differ-
ent active working groups, and has released several iterations of the growing OF standard
to date.
3.2 Premise of SDN
It is important to distinguish that OF is not synonymous with SDN and even though much
work within SDN over the past few years is with the free and open-source OF protocol,
using the OF protocol is not required in an SDN architecture. Some major vendors in
the networking industry, along with supporting OF in their products, are hard at work in
developing their own proprietary SDN solutions [58], [59], some of which can work along
side or in place of the OF protocol. Even though SDN would appear to be a new technology,
its general concepts of separating layers and gaining more programmable control within a
system have been around for much longer as further detailed in a recent paper covering the
history of SDN [60].
As mentioned in §1.1.2, and derived from the ONF White Paper on SDN, the primitives of
SDN, and specifically the OF protocol, are:
1. Decoupling of the network switch management control plane from the data plane.
2. Centralized controller to manage one or more switches.
3. Ability to manage the behavior of the network using well-defined interfaces and stan-
dards based programs.
4. The ability to manage devices across multiple vendor switches through non-
proprietary programmability.
The basic SDN architecture in Figure 3.1 [8], is logically represented as three layers: Infras-
tructure Layer, Control Layer, and Application Layer. Common discussion in the industry
regarding SDN networks is normally from the perspective of the Control Layer where the
SDN controller resides, as the controller is the central component that manages an SDN
network. Anything in the Application Layer is usually referred to as northbound, as it
resides above the Control Layer; and the Infrastructure Layer is commonly referred to as
28
southbound, as it resides below the Control Layer. The underlying Infrastructure Layer
consists of network devices (from one or more vendors), communicating with one or more
SDN controllers at the Control Layer. OF is the controlling protocol providing a stan-
dard interface from the SDN controller, pushing the network policy southbound to each
network device (again, to one or more vendor switches), effectively decoupling the con-
trol plane from the data plane. Though the initial concept and this architecture shows a
centralized controller, more advanced schemes call for multiple or distributed controllers
within an SDN architecture, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. In some
implementations, specific purpose applications are written and integrated within the SDN
controller, but the long-term goal with SDN is to clearly define boundaries between the
controller and the applications they support through clearly defined northbound Applica-
tion Programming Interfaces (APIs).
Figure 3.1: Software-Defined Network Architecture. From [8]
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3.3 SDN OpenFlow Controllers
The central policy orchestrator of an SDN network is the controller. Ethane did not draw a
distinction between the central controller and the communication protocol in use between
the controller and the Ethane switches. With the release of the OF protocol, this distinction
is established by the simultaneous release of NOX, the first SDN controller that utilizes the
OF protocol. NOX is considered an operating system for networks, providing a program-
ming interface for northbound applications to interface with the network, and a southbound
interface to manage network devices through the OF protocol. NOX was designed and re-
leased in conjunction with the first OF switch specification, and made available for free
download [61], [62].
The OF switch specification is not a packaged library for download, but merely defined
in the standards document with C style code. SDN controller developers and OF-enabled
switch vendors must correctly interpret the standard and code in OF functionality. The con-
trollers are typically built from table top and rack-mounted enterprise computers running
some version of the Linux operating system and loaded with additional development tools
to facilitate programming the controller’s functionality. Specific SDN controller packages
can be obtained from their respective website for download and installation. Development
of vendor specific and open-source SDN controllers has expanded since NOX was released
Vendor Controllers OpenSource Controllers
(programming language)
Big Switch NOX, MUL, ovs-controller
(C)
NEC ProgrammableFlow POX, Ryu
(Python)
Juniper JunOS Space SDK Trema
(C, Ruby)
Cisco onePK Beacon, Floodlight, IRIS,
Jaxon, Maestro, OpenDaylight
(Java)
HP VAN SDN NodeFlow
(JavaScript)
Table 3.1: Some common vendor and opensource SDN controllers.
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nearly six years ago, as detailed in Table 3.1. It is important to understand that no two
SDN controllers are the same, not only with the degree of openness in the source code or
the programming language it was developed under, but also the OF switch specification
version each supports, which we will further discuss in §3.4. As well, some open-source
controller projects are sponsored by major switch vendors, (e.g., Floodlight) [63]. Other
controller projects remain strictly community-driven projects, such as NOX and the Python
OpenFlow Controller (POX) [61].
3.4 The OpenFlow Switch Specification
Even though the OF protocol debuted in 2008 with the initial version of the OF switch
specification, the first major version actually considered ready for industry adoption and
implementation was not until version 1.0.0, released December 31, 2009 [64]. There are
several different iterations of OF switch specification documents released since then, each
providing additional functionality to the OF protocol and available on ONF’s website [5];
with major changes between iterations detailed in Appendix A. As previously mentioned,
no actual OF library exists to download and plug-in to an SDN controller or vendor switch
to implement a particular OF switch specification version. The creators of each SDN con-
troller and OF switch must correctly interpret the specifications documents and implement
the version standard correctly, hence why subsequent specification documents include a
long list of changes and clarifications to minimize ambiguity.
Since OF version 1.0.0 was the first that vendor support was expected, and by which any
equipment claiming to be OF-enabled must at a minimum support, our discussion will pri-
mary focus on functionality from this version. An OF-enabled switch is one for which
the vendor has coded the switch firmware to facilitate communication with the OF pro-
tocol, applying the policies and rule-set pushed to it from an SDN controller. Initial
specifications by default established communications over TCP port 6633, however, use
of that port was never registered with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
and subsequently assigned by IANA for other services. OF switch specification version
1.0.2 [65] and 1.3.3 [66] highlight the change to IANA assigned TCP port 6653 for switch-
to-controller communication.
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An OF switch normally initiates a connection to an SDN controller that it has been pre-
configured to communicate with, though recently released OF switch specification ver-
sion 1.3.2 [67], if implemented by the SDN controller and OF switch vendor used in a
network, provides a method for the controller to instead initiate the connection with the
switch. Through this switch-to-controller session, various control and management mes-
sage types are used to enable the controller to poll information about the switch, for the
switch and controller to manage traffic based on flow entries established by the set policy,
and simple session management messages to keep the connection alive. If the switch loses
communication with a controller, it can be configured to operate in one of two modes:
fail-secure, where traffic continues to flow based on table entries until those entries ex-
pire; or fail-standalone, where the switch expires all table entries and operates based on the
pre-configured default switch behavior.
A basic OF switch consists of a single flow-table by which the controller can set flow
entries on the switch based on packet header match fields, defined by the configured policy
pushed to it by the SDN controller, as illustrated in Table 3.2. Each entry in the flow-table
has associated counters to track the number of matches against each flow entry. All packets
that enter the switch are processed against the table entries, much like a packet entering
a router can be matched against an ACL. A match against an entry will cause the packet
to be handled based on the flow entry’s set action. A failure to match a packet against an
entry in the flow-table, known as a table miss, will by default forward the packet to the
SDN controller for processing. As well, we can specifically set flow match rules with the
specific action to forward a packet to the controller. This action and more will be discussed
in more detail below and in §3.4. Packets can also be injected from the SDN controller
through a connected OF switch and sent out on the network.
Header Fields Counters Actions
Table 3.2: A flow entry consists of header fields, counters, and actions. From [64]
An OF switch is limited, however, in the number of header fields by which it can match
packets as illustrated in Table 3.3. By comparison to the OSI model layers, we match fields
in layers one through four. At layer 1, the physical layer, we can match a packet based
on the physical port it arrived. At layer 2, the data link layer, we can match a packet on
the Ethernet source and destination address, and the Ethernet type. If VLANs are used in
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the network, we can also match based on the VLAN Identification number and the VLAN
priority [68]. At layer 3, the network layer, we can match a packet based on the IP source
address and destination address, the IP protocol, and the IP Type-of-Service (ToS) field.
Most traffic across a network will typically be TCP or UDP as discussed in §2.2.2, and
as such, we can match at layer 4, the transport layer, the source port and destination port.
However, we also discussed ICMP in §2.2.1, a common protocol for error reporting be-
tween host. A match of the IP protocol to be ICMP, will instead of source and destination
port, use those match fields as ICMP Type and Code. When creating OF match rules for
the header fields, we are limited to specifying either a specific value or the default “ANY.”
The one exception to the match field value limitation is the addition of maskable datalink
and network source and destination addresses added in OF switch specification version
1.1 [69], where we can test for a range of MAC and IP addresses. Otherwise there is no
way to specify a range of values to match in a particular field, such as if we wanted to
match a range of TCP or UDP port numbers.
Ingress Ether Ether Ether VLAN VLAN IP IP IP IP Src Dst
Port Src Dst Type ID Priority Src Dst Proto ToS Port Port
Table 3.3: 12-tuple fields to match packets against flow entries. From [64]
A break down of the Ethernet frame is illustrated in Figure 3.2, showing the potential OF
match fields highlighted. Reading the frame from left to right, there is nothing to be gained
by matching against the preamble or Start Frame Delimiter (SFD) as these are common
amongst all frames in an Ethernet network. The Preamble is a special 7 byte series of


































Figure 3.2: The Ethernet header with OF matchable fields highlighted.
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is a special 1 byte (01111110) to indicate to the switch that what follows is the actual frame
header to be read. The first useful information in an Ethernet frame is the Destination
Address (DA) and the Source Address (SA), which are a 6 byte (48 bit) MAC address to
uniquely identify physical nodes on an Ethernet network. If VLAN tagging is used in the
network, OF can match specifically on the VLAN Identification number (12 bits) and the
VLAN User Priority (3 bits). The TYPE field in an Ethernet frame is to indicate the type
of payload carried in the data portion of the frame: 0x0800 for IP, for 0x0806 for Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP), 0x8100 for VLAN, etc. The data portion of a frame is simply
the frame’s payload, layers 3 through 7 of the OSI layer with their individual headers and
payloads. Lastly, the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is a method to determine if an
error occurred in the transmission of the frame, if the CRC check fails, the frame is simply
dropped.
The primary purpose of a router is to move packets between networks, and the IP header
information, as illustrated in Figure 3.3 with the potential OF match fields highlighted, is
the main criteria by which routers make their decision. The first field of interest is the IP
version: IPv4 or Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). As we are focused on discussion of OF
switch specification 1.0.0, this field is not highlighted, however, support for IPv6 was added
in late 2011 with the release of OF version 1.2 [70]. The first highlighted OF matchable
0
Version IHL Type4of4Service Total4Length
Identification Fragment4Offset






Figure 3.3: The IP header with OF matchable fields highlighted.
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field of interest is the ToS field, which originally under RFC 791 [43] allowed assigning a
priority to each IP packet and request special handling of the packet. Many representations
of the IP header still indicate this field for ToS, and the OF switch specification code it
as the “NW_TOS” field. However, RFC 2474 [71] redefined the first 6 bits this field for
Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) to provide more detailed marking of packets for
Quality of Service (QoS) controls; and RFC 3168 [72] redefined the last 2 bits for Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN) to indicate if congestion was experienced in transit. We can
also match on IP protocol, which numbers from zero to 255, and commonly used values
are 6 for TCP, 17 for UDP, and 1 for ICMP. Lastly, we can match on the IP source address
and destination address. What is interesting to note are some of the other fields that OF
cannot match against, which could be useful depending on our implemented purpose. The
Flags and Fragment Offset has to do with packet fragmentation, and since we are unable to
match against these fields in the current OF standard, we are unable to do anything special
with fragmented traffic at the switch level. Another interesting field that would be useful
to match against is the TTL value, as previously discussed in §2.2.4. Lastly, it would be
interesting to dig into the optional “IP Options” portion of an IP packet, but the potential
variance in the way options are constructed could be quite complex to implement.
Finally, we can perform OF match functions against the source and destination port number
in a UDP and TCP header, as highlighted in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5, respectfully. There
is no more to be gained from a UDP header beyond the port numbers, as the length only
identifies the size of the UDP payload and the checksum is designed to detect errors. There
is, however, a wealth of potentially useful information that could be gained through matches
in a TCP header, but current OF standards do not enable matches against these fields.
For example, having view into the Sequence Number, Acknowledgment Number, and the
many TCP flags could allow a detailed stateful inspection of traffic, but this would also
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Figure 3.5: The TCP header with OF matchable fields highlighted.
require significant memory capabilities of the switch to maintain that state information.
Last, TCP’s optional “TCP Options” would be interesting to match against, but as with the
optional IP options, the potential variance in the way the options are constructed could be
quite complex to implement.
As we have explained, there are many ways we can construct match criteria, though limited,
for flows in a OF switch table. Having access to the full range of header information to
match packets with OF could allow creation of extensive SDN solutions with OF-enabled
switches. There are other tools, such as netfilter’s iptables [73], that can be installed and
configured on a basic Linux host, which has extensive kernel level hooks to the network
stack, and allows full range management and manipulation of packets. As such, this allows
employing iptables for stateful and stateless firewalls, proxies, IDSs and IPSs, and many
other solutions. Unless the OF standards were further extended to include these additional
packet header fields, thereby achieving the same granular packet control and manipulation
as iptables, we instead have to perform less granular flow matches on packets and forward
those packets to the controller, where we could then employ other tools on packets at the
user level. We will further discuss the impact of these limited OF match fields in supporting
our deceptive dynamic network topology in follow-on chapters.
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There are some considerations when constructing match conditions for flows, in that match-
ing at a higher layer, requires at least one supported match other than “ANY” at a lower
layer. For example, to match VLAN ID and Priority, there must be an Ethernet Type match
of 0x8100 for VLAN. Setting a rule with Ethernet Type of “ANY” will not enable check-
ing for specific VLAN tagging information within a frame. If we want to match network
layer header information such as source and destination IP addresses, then we must at a
minimum match Ethernet Type at the datalink layer of 0x0800 for IP. To move up the stack
and match UDP or TCP port numbers, then we must match the associated protocol number
in the IP header, and have matched Ethernet Type at the datalink layer of 0x0800 for IP.
Matching ICMP Code and Type is similar in that we must match the IP protocol as ICMP,
and have matched Ethernet Type at the datalink layer of 0x0800 for IP. Though this would
seem to indicate the ability to inspect for malformed and corrupted packets, OF Switch
Errata version 1.0.1 [74] provided clarification that “the specification does not define the
expected behavior when a switch receives a malformed or corrupted packet.”
As previously mentioned, each of these table flows will have associated counters main-
tained on the OF-enabled switch and methods by which the controller can query these
Action Description
Required:
ALL Send the packet out all interfaces, not including the
incoming interface.
CONTROLLER Encapsulate and send the packet to the controller.
LOCAL Send the packet to the switch’s local networking
stack.
TABLE Perform actions in flow-table. Only for packet-out
messages.
IN_PORT Send the packet out the input port.
Optional:
NORMAL Process the packet using the traditional forwarding
path supported by the switch.
FLOOD Flood the packet along the minimum spanning tree,
not including the incoming interface.
Table 3.4: Required and optional OF table match actions. From [64]
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counters. But these flows are incomplete without also defining an associated “Action” for a
match against a flow entry. We previously mentioned one default action for a packet, which
is to forward the packet to the controller on a table miss, where there is no matching flow
entry on the switch. The other default action for a packet is when a specific flow entry sim-
ply does not specify an action, in which case the default action then is to drop the packet.
Table 3.4 provides the required actions that an OF-enabled switch must support for physi-
cal and virtual ports, and some additional optional actions that the switch can support for
virtual ports. Again, we will make specific use of the “Controller” action in matching probe
packets to forward to the controller so as to craft customized deceptive response packets to
present a false network topology.
When an OF switch starts up and establishes a connection to the controller, the flow-table of
that switch will be empty, unless some pre-configured flow entries are pushed to the switch.
Recall that the default action on a table miss, a packet fails to match any flow entry in the
flow-table, is to forward the packet to the controller for processing. Therefore, the con-
troller will normally receive an initial surge of packets forwarded to it as table misses occur
on the switch, because of these lack of flow-table entries. Based on the configured policy on
the SDN controller, flow entries will then be generated from the controller-received packet
and pushed to the switch for inclusion in the flow-table to match future packets. As packets
continue to arrive on the switch, they will be checked, line-by-line, against the flow-table
entries on the switch for a match. If a match is made on a flow entry, the pre-defined action
for that flow as listed in Table 3.4 is performed on the packet, and no additional entries
further down the flow-table are checked. This could present a problem as some flow entries
may be more granular than others, potentially allowing certain packets to match on a flow
entry and an action taken that was not intended.
As an example, say we want to block all ICMP packets, but allow all other traffic, regardless
of protocol or port number. The easiest way to simply allow all other traffic through is by
just matching on Ethernet Type of IP. However, as soon as a single packet that is not ICMP
arrives at the switch after startup, is then sent to the controller due to a table miss and
processed by the controller, and a flow entry created on the switch, the lack of granularity
in the flow entry would then also match and allow all ICMP packets through the network
instead of blocking them. This is because ICMP is carried on IP and the rule established
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allowed all IP through, including the ICMP packet. To alleviate this problem, we could
simply establish more granular match criteria for the non-ICMP traffic as well, such as a
separate rule for TCP and UDP traffic, but now we also have to specify how the controller
is to handle other protocols as well. A simpler method to manage the ordering of multi-
field flow entries on the table is to set the priority level for the flow entries pushed to the
switch, which is a 216 value field, allowing a priority range from 1 to 65535. The higher
the number, the higher the priority of the flow entry in the table. As such, more restrictive
flow rules should be set with a higher priority to be checked first, and in our example, we
would set the ICMP flow entry with a higher priority number than the less granular flow
entries. This would ensure an incoming packet is first checked against the more restrictive
rule to block ICMP.
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In this chapter, we present the specifics of our constructed test environment and the details
of how we implemented our deceptive topology through SDN and the OF protocol. We
first discuss the design overview of our experiment and the reason for an initial limited
approach to blocking specific types of probe traffic. We then discuss the network design
to include routers, switches, etc., along with the choice of software selection in our test
environment. Next, we discuss the details of the SDN controller and specifically how the
OF switch is configured. Last, we describe the details of network operations to include
switch-to-controller communication establishment, to deception policy configuration, and
how probe packets are handled and the deceptive responses generated.
4.1 Design Overview
As discussed in Chapter 2 traceroute probes can be constructed using ICMP, UDP, or TCP
packets. Previous work, [16], focused on detecting and responding specifically to UDP
probes, however, as ICMP is primarily used for network testing and error reporting, we
will focus our efforts first on detecting and responding to ICMP traceroute probes. As well,
ICMP is more simplistic in that it typically does not carry application level data as a UDP
or TCP packet is designed to do. Therefore, we need not focus on differentiating between
legitimate data communications and network probes with ICMP as we would with UDP
and TCP packets. We could specifically define rule-sets for the full range of ICMP packet
types, however, for simplicity sake, we will only focus on matching ICMP Echo messages
and provide equivalent ICMP Time Exceeded and Echo Reply messages as discussed in
§2.2.1. More importantly, ICMP Echo messages are really the only packets that are likely
to get through anyway, and are what is typically used when doing ICMP-based traceroute.
Therefore, all other ICMP Types and Code messages will be dropped as no rule is defined
to process them.
As discussed in §3.4, once a packet is sent to user space on the controller, we can employ
other methods to fully manipulate individual packets. From the controller we can inspect
the IP TTL and other packet header information to craft our customized reply messages to
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individual probes. These reply messages can then be sent to the switch to be forwarded to
the probe originator.
4.2 Network Design
Since the focus of our research is to determine if the premises of SDN and the OF proto-
col can enable employing a dynamic deceptive network topology as initially presented in
previous work [16], we modeled our network design to closely mimic the design employed
in that work; as depicted in Figure 4.1. Our experiment also used a simple three-node net-
work comprised of the adversary’s workstation and a target web server, but instead of a
custom designed intelligent router to separate the two, our SDN solution has in place an
OF-enabled switch connected to an SDN controller. The only actual physical node in our
experiment network is the OF-enabled switch, interfaced to a multi-homed desktop com-
puter that hosts the rest of the test network. All other nodes are constructed in a virtual
environment running on a multi-port desktop computer. The interface links are all Ether-
net, running Full-duplex at 100 Mbps. With the exception of the switch-to-controller link
(in blue), each network segment was configured with a standard class C network block of
172.20.x.x/24. The link connecting the switch and controller was configured with a stan-
dard class C network block of 192.168.x.x/24. Detailed interface addressing is indicated
Figure 4.1: Experiment topology implemented in virtual environment. All IP addresses are
on the 172.20.x.x network, with the exception of the SDN controller interface to the OF
switch on the 192.168.x.x network.
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in Figure 4.1. The detailed physical port interfacing of the OF switch will be discussed
further in §4.5.
Given that the goal is to prevent an adversary from accurately mapping the true topology
of the protected network, we deploy our deceptive topology generating solution near the
ingress point of the private network. In this case, R1 is the border router separating the
private network link from the service provider link. Any host probing the private network
would observe ground truth of the network topology up to the border router (R1), after-
wards all other responses to network probes would be provided by the deceptive solution.
The OF switch itself is not visible to network probes since it is not acting as layer 3 router.
4.3 Software Selection
The host for our experiment network was built on a single desktop computer running
the Ubuntu Linux 12.04.3 [75] operating system. We used Graphic Network Simula-
tor (GNS3) [76] to design and configure our virtual network environment of routers, ad-
versary host, web server, the SDN controller, and to interconnect the physical OF network
switch. This allows us the flexibility to build and modify our test architecture without
the need to use expensive physical hardware and significant physical space to house the
test network. GNS3 makes use of additional emulators to run actual router Internetwork
Operating System (IOS) software and to run the guest virtual machine operating system.
This enables the routers and guest machines to provide full functionality in the network,
equivalent to what a dedicated physical router and physical server would provide.
Each of the routers in the experiment topology (R1 through R6) was a virtual Cisco 3725
router running Cisco IOS Version 12.4(15)T14, release software with field change 2. The
choice of router was simply availability of actual router IOS software from on-hand physi-
cal Cisco routers. Actual implementation of our SDN solution, with an SDN controller and
OF-enabled switch, could be deployed in any network environment with smaller home-
office routers or large enterprise grade routers, depending on the needs of the network.
All routers were configured to run Routing Information Protocol (RIP) version 2, a simple
distance vector routing protocol to control packet routing within the network.
For the guest virtual machine operating system, specifically the SDN Controller and the
web server, also ran Ubuntu Linux 12.04.3, as was used on the host computer. We will
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discuss further the specific software configuration of the SDN Controller in §4.4. The
only additional software loaded on the web server was a FOSS wiki program to provide a
functioning web server for testing. The adversary guest virtual machine was loaded with
BackTrack Linux 5.0 [77], a Linux-based penetration testing platform that comes preloaded
with numerous utilities, including many network probing utilities.
4.4 SDN Controller Configuration
As discussed in §3.3, there are numerous SDN controllers to select from in designing an
SDN network architecture. For simplicity, we chose to use the POX [61] SDN OF con-
troller due to our familiarity with the Python [78] programming language. Additionally,
the POX library is somewhat simple to work with as it is largely targeted for research
and education purposes. The only dependencies for running POX is Python 2.7 or higher.
Otherwise, we simply downloaded the latest branch release of POX, version 0.2.0 (carp),
from the GitHub [79] repository to the Ubuntu Linux SDN controller virtual machine. A
community-driven POX Wiki [80] provides detailed guidance for installing and running
POX, as well as describing POX features and interfaces for working with the OF protocol
coded into the controller to build custom SDN controller applications.
We discussed at length the many details of the baseline OF switch specification in §3.4,
along with some additional changes to the OF protocol included in later switch specification
versions. Major changes between switch specification versions is highlighted in Appendix
A. The current POX version 0.2.0 (carp) only supports OF switch specification version
1.0.0, with some additional extensions from switch specification version 1.1, though is
sufficient to support our basic analysis and testing of the OF protocol in developing our
custom SDN controller.
The POX library directory structure is very simply laid out. In the root folder are several
“readme” files, along with two key Python script files: pox.py and debug-pox.py. Both
of these Python script files are used to invoke POX and can take several arguments as
input. The “debug-pox.py” script automatically provides a host of debugging output for
development purposes. Some of the additional arguments can include: specifying an al-
ternating listening port for the SDN controller to listen for incoming connection request
from an OF switch; specifying output logging methods; specifying the filename of the cus-
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tom SDN controller to load and run; and chaining features from other python files, such
as flow visualizers. The “pox” subdirectory contains the core of the POX functionality,
to include several subdirectories of example Python code for basic SDN controller func-
tionality. Our customized deceptive controller made use of example code from several
provided files: pong.py, hub.py, and example.py. Of the many subdirectories contained
the pox subdirectory, the “lib” directory and the “openflow” directory contain the majority
of additional Python class files we need to create our custom controller. Specifically, the
lib directory contains the packet superclass directory, which contains specific Python class
files for working with the common supported protocols, such as ICMP, UDP, TCP, etc. We
will make use of the methods from these class files when deconstructing and reconstructing
individual packets sent to the SDN controller from the OF-enabled switch. The “openflow”
directory contains the POX developed class files as interpreted from the OF switch specifi-
cation. We will provide specific operational details of our customized controller in §4.6.
4.5 OF Switch Configuration
For our test environment, we used a commercial vendor [81], 24-port, OF-enabled, Ethernet
enterprise switch. Our configuration initially ran switch firmware version WB.15.13.0000,
which supported OF Switch Specification 1.0.0. We later upgraded to the latest switch
firmware release, version WB.15.14.0002, that provided some bug fixes among other
changes.
Since the switch was the only physical hardware in use other than the multi-port desktop
computer that hosted our virtual test environment, all physical interfaces from the switch
were interconnected to physical Ethernet Network Interface Cards (NICs) on the desktop
computer. This point of demarcation is illustrated in Figure 4.1 by the small gray box
with a red slash. Each physical Ethernet NIC in the computer was associated with a sin-
gle interface on a virtual network device in our GNS3 managed virtual environment. The
internal facing port of router (R1) was interconnected with physical Ethernet port 1 on the
OF switch; and the external facing port of router (R2) was interconnected with physical
Ethernet port 2 on the OF switch. The SDN controller was interconnected with the switch
out-of-band management (OOBM) Ethernet port, which operates on the switches’ manage-
ment plane. Older network equipment typically included a console port, which enabled an
administrator to establish a serial connection with a computer, and perform command-line
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configuration of the device. The serial port was considered a form of OOBM as normal user
traffic would not transit the console port. To establish a telnet or secure shell command line
or web management interface with the network equipment over IP, required connecting
through one of the switches data ports. This method was considered in-band management
and required connecting a dedicated computer to one of the ports, or a using a computer
on the network that could reach the network equipment via an IP address. Most newer
network equipment now include a dedicated OOBM Ethernet port to allow connection of
a dedicated computer for management of the devices, or construct a separate management
to manage many network device, without that traffic traversing the normal data paths of
the network. As traffic is normally not allowed to cross directly from the data plane to
the management plane, this adds an additional layer of security for the switch-to-controller
connection.
There are several different ways in which the switch could be configured to participate in
an SDN environment. The vendor’s switch OpenFlow Administrator’s Guide [82] provides
details of these different configuration methods, and provides the steps we used to configure
the OF-enabled switch used in our test network. Details of these configurations are captured
in Appendix B, the switch startup configuration file.
4.6 Deceptive Network Operations
Once the OF switch is interfaced in the network and the required OF parameters are config-
ured, the switch will continue to function as a normal layer-two switch until a connection is
established with the SDN controller. This is because we chose to configure the “connection-
interruption-mode,” which defines the behavior of the switch when it loses connection with
its configured controller, to fail-standalone as discussed in §3.4. This choice was simply
for ease in conducting comparative network probing with and without the deceptive topol-
ogy enabled. With the switch OF parameters configured, and the OF mode enabled on the
switch, the switch will poll for its configured controller every 60 seconds.
With the OF switch configured and polling for its associated SDN controller, we then need
to launch the customized SDN controller to listen and accept the connection request from
the switch, and establish policy on the network. This is performed by by invoking POX
as discussed in §4.4 with the necessary arguments. In a production environment, the SDN
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controller can be configured to automatically execute the POX script on system startup and
to restart the service if it were to fail. For our experiment purposes, we chose to manually
invoke POX with the following command syntax:
. / pox . py openf low . of_01 −−p o r t =6653 t o p o d e c e p t i o n
Here we see the “pox.py” startup script called with some additional arguments. Normally
“openflow.of_01” is called automatically when launching the POX script and does not need
to be addressed. However, we include it in our command syntax to change the listener port
on the SDN controller in accordance with the new IANA registered port as discussed in
§3.4, as this change has not yet been incorporated in the current version of POX installed.
The “openflow.of_01” component of POX provides all the required methods from the OF
standard to enable communication with OF-enabled switches as discussed in §3.4. The
last item in the command syntax is reference to our customized Python POX controller
filename, “topodeception.py”.
Once the script is run, POX will execute our custom controller in the background. The
first step for our custom controller is to import all the specified Python libraries needed to
run our custom controller, as specified in the topodeception.py script file. Three Global
variables are set for common default system TTLs that will be referenced when generating
deceptive response packets: Cisco router - 255, Microsoft Operating Systems - 128, and
Linux Operating Systems - 64. Next, POX will execute the defined launch operations from
our custom controller and open a listener for incoming connection requests from an OF-
enabled switch.
d e f l a u n c h ( ) :
# Open l i s t e n e r f o r s w i t c h t o c o n n e c t t o c o n t r o l l e r
c o r e . openf low . addLis tenerByName ( ‘ ‘ Connect ionUp ’ ’ , _hand le_Connec t ionUp )
With the controller listening on TCP port 6653 at script startup and the OF-enabled switch
still polling for its controller, a connection request should be established within 60 seconds.
Once the controller receives the connection request from the switch, a session between the
switch and controller will be established. The controller will send the switch a features re-
quest message to learn the specific capabilities of the switch, such as the number and speed
of the ports, OF version supported, etc. Once the session is established and the controller
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has learned the switch particulars, we would normally open a listener for incoming packets
sent by the switch from either by a flow-table miss, or specifically sent through a “CON-
TROLLER” flow action. However, since we are employing our SDN solution to perform
specific actions on probe traffic, we pre-load two flow rules on the switch before opening a
listener for incoming packets.
d e f _hand le_Connec t ionUp ( e v e n t ) :
# Rule t o f o r w a r d a l l ICMP t r a f f i c t o t h e c o n t r o l l e r
msg = of . ofp_flow_mod ( )
msg . p r i o r i t y = 2 # Higher number , h i g h e r p r i o r i t y
msg . match . d l _ t y p e = p k t . e t h e r n e t . IP_TYPE
msg . match . nw_proto = p k t . i pv4 . ICMP_PROTOCOL
msg . a c t i o n s . append ( o f . o f p _ a c t i o n _ o u t p u t ( p o r t = o f . OFPP_CONTROLLER ) )
e v e n t . c o n n e c t i o n . send ( msg )
# Rule t o p r o c e s s a l l o t h e r t r a f f i c a s t h e s w i t c h n o r m a l l y would
msg = of . ofp_flow_mod ( )
msg . p r i o r i t y = 1 # Lower number , l ower p r i o r i t y
msg . match . d l _ t y p e = p k t . e t h e r n e t . IP_TYPE
msg . a c t i o n s . append ( o f . o f p _ a c t i o n _ o u t p u t ( p o r t = o f .OFPP_NORMAL ) )
e v e n t . c o n n e c t i o n . send ( msg )
# Open l i s t e n e r f o r incoming ICMP p a c k e t s from s w i t c h
t r y :
c o r e . openf low . addLis tenerByName ( " P a c k e t I n " , _ h a n d l e _ P a c k e t I n )
l o g . i n f o ( " L i s t e n e r opened f o r ICMP t r a f f i c " )
e x c e p t I O E r r o r :
l o g . i n f o ( " E r r o r open ing l i s t e n e r f o r ICMP t r a f f i c " )
When the controller signals that the connection with the switch is up, that event triggers
the pre-loading of our two flow rules. Recall from §3.4 that we can use flow priorities to
control the order of flow-table entries on the switch. As well, to make an upper layer header
field match, we must first perform a dependent lower layer header field match. The first
flow rule is set with a priority of 2 to match the IP protocol of ICMP. The OF switch action
for a match on this flow entry is to forward the packet to the controller for processing.
The second flow rule is set with a prior of 1 to match all other IP packets, which will
include UDP and TCP packets. The OF switch action for a match on this flow entry is to
forward the packet for normal processing, using the traditional forwarding path supported
by the switch. With both our pre-loaded flow rules set on the switch, we open a listener for
incoming packets sent to the controller from the switch.
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d e f _ h a n d l e _ P a c k e t I n ( e v e n t ) :
p a c k e t = e v e n t . p a r s e d
# Check f o r P r o t o c o l Type 1 "ICMP"
i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " icmp " ) :
# Reply t o p r o b e s
i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " icmp " ) . t y p e == p k t . TYPE_ECHO_REQUEST :
icmp = p k t . icmp ( )
i p p = p k t . i pv4 ( )
# S e t v a r i a b l e s f o r c a l l i n g a t t r i b u t e s from p a c k e t
p_ in = p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " )
pp_ in = p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . p a y l o a d
echop = p a c k e t . f i n d ( " echo " )
# F i l l e r f o r Type 3 and 11 r e p l i e s message
icmp_unused = 0 # used as 2−b y t e i n icmp . p a y l o a d
icmp_next_mtu = 0 # used as 2−b y t e i n icmp . p a y l o a d
# Check i f TTL == 1
i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . t t l == 1 :
# pe r fo rm a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n s
# E l s e TTL i s g r e a t e r t h a n 1 , Echo Reply
e l i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . t t l > 1 :
# pe r fo rm a d d i t i o n a l a c t i o n s
# E l s e ICMP was o t h e r t h a n Echo Reques t and w i l l be d i s c a r d e d
e l s e :
r e t u r n
On the event of a packet arriving at the controller, we inspect the IP protocol to verify that
it is an ICMP packet. With the current configuration, we should not expect any packets
other than ICMP to be sent to the controller. However, a potential exists for malformed
packets or non-IP packets to arrive at the switch, causing a flow-table miss, and the packet
to be forwarded to the controller for processing. We verify that the received packet is an
ICMP packet before processing further, otherwise the packet is dropped at the controller.
We then inspect the ICMP Type for Type 8, Echo request messages, before processing
further. Having verified that the packet for processing is an ICMP Type 8 Echo message,
we setup some working variables to simplify constructing response messages. Based on
the current depth of our constructed deceptive topology we wish to present, we have only
two TTL values to inspect for: TTL equal to 1, and TTL greater than 1. We will address
this distinction in TTL shortly. From these two conditional checks, we will further perform
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conditional checks on the destination IP address in the probe packet to determine the correct
deceptive response.
# Check i f TTL == 1
i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . t t l == 1 :
# I f DST IP == t h e near−s i d e r o u t e r IP ADDR, p r o v i d e ECHO Reply
i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . d s t i p == IPAddr ( " 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 " ) :
icmp . t y p e = p k t . TYPE_ECHO_REPLY
icmp . p a y l o a d = p a c k e t . f i n d ( " icmp " ) . p a y l o a d
i p p . s r c i p = p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . d s t i p
r e p l y _ t t l = DEFAULT_RTR_TTL
# I f DST IP == t h e f a r−s i d e r o u t e r IP ADDR, p r o v i d e ECHO Reply
e l i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . d s t i p == IPAddr ( " 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 1 " ) :
icmp . t y p e = p k t . TYPE_ECHO_REPLY
icmp . p a y l o a d = p a c k e t . f i n d ( " icmp " ) . p a y l o a d
i p p . s r c i p = p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . d s t i p
r e p l y _ t t l = DEFAULT_RTR_TTL
# I f DST IP == t h e p r o t e c t e d hos t , p r o v i d e Time Exceeded
e l i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . d s t i p == IPAddr ( " 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 " ) :
icmp . t y p e = p k t . TYPE_TIME_EXCEED
icmp . code = 0
icmp . p a y l o a d = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ !HHBBHHHBBHIIBBHHH’ , icmp_unused ,
icmp_next_mtu , ( p_ in . v << 4) + p_ in . h l ,
p_ in . t o s , p_ in . i p l e n , p_ in . id ,
( p_ in . f l a g s << 13) | p_ in . f r a g , p_ in . t t l ,
p_ in . p r o t o c o l , p_ in . csum ,
p_ in . s r c i p . t o U n s i g n e d ( ) ,
p_ in . d s t i p . t o U n s i g n e d ( ) ,
pp_ in . type , pp_ in . code , pp_ in . csum ,
echop . id , echop . seq )
i p p . s r c i p = IPAddr ( " 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 " )
r e p l y _ t t l = DEFAULT_RTR_TTL
# I f DST IP == any o t h e r IP a d d r e s s , p r o v i d e DST U n r e a c h a b l e
e l s e :
icmp . t y p e = p k t . TYPE_DEST_UNREACH
icmp . code = 1
icmp . p a y l o a d = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ !HHBBHHHBBHIIBBHHH’ , icmp_unused ,
icmp_next_mtu , ( p_ in . v << 4) + p_ in . h l ,
p_ in . t o s , p_ in . i p l e n , p_ in . id ,
( p_ in . f l a g s << 13) | p_ in . f r a g , p_ in . t t l ,
p_ in . p r o t o c o l , p_ in . csum ,
p_ in . s r c i p . t o U n s i g n e d ( ) ,
p_ in . d s t i p . t o U n s i g n e d ( ) ,
pp_ in . type , pp_ in . code , pp_ in . csum ,
echop . id , echop . seq )
i p p . s r c i p = IPAddr ( " 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 " )
r e p l y _ t t l = DEFAULT_RTR_TTL
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As discussed in §4.2, our OF switch itself is not visible to network probes since it is es-
sentially a multi-layer switch, capable of reading frames up to layer 3 and layer 4 of the
OSI model. Recall from Figure 4.1, the OF switch sits in the link between router (R1) and
(R2). Therefore, the OF switch does not participate as a standard hop in the path before
the deceptive topology is presented, as did the intelligent router in previous work [16]. The
switch does allow RIP updates to pass between router (R1) and (R2) using the switch’s
traditional path. As such, we implemented our deceptive path slightly different as an ad-
versary could learn, through network probing, one of the two ground truth router IP address
for the link between (R1) and (R2); specifically that the private network facing interface on
router (R1) is configured with IP address 172.20.1.2. We therefore virtually collapse router
(R2) and (R5) in our deceptive topology implementation as represented in the previous
block of code.
For the first conditional check of a packets with a TTL equal to 1, we are only presenting
deceptive responses to probes destined to three IP address. Recall that the default behavior
of a network router is to inspect the TTL of an incoming packet, and if the packet TTL is
equal to 1 and not destined for a port on that router, to decrement the TTL and drop the
packet, sending an ICMP Type 8 Code 0, Time Exceeded in Transit message back to the
source of the packet. The first node we present in the deceptive topology is our collapsed
router (R2/R5), with the near side interface of 172.20.1.2, and the far side interface of
172.20.5.1. A probe packet destined to either of these two interfaces with a TTL equal to
1 would solicit a normal Echo reply. Since this is the first layer router in our presented
deceptive topology, we just set the reply TTL equal to a default router TTL of 255. The
next node we present is the web server at address 172.20.5.2, and if a probe packet with a
TTL of 1 arrived at the router destined to the web server, the TTL would be decremented to
zero and a Time Exceeded packet would be sent back to the host. Since the current version
POX library did not fully implement the Time Exceeded type in the icmp.py class file, we
implemented our own struct to create the reply message payload. For all other destination
IP addresses, we could take one of two approaches. We could simply not provide response
messages and possibly lead the adversary to believe that some form of packet filtering was
in use, or we could simply reply with an ICMP Type 3 Code 1, Destination Unreachable,
Host Unreachable, message as the last “else” statement provides. Next we review the
actions for a probe packet with a TTL greater than 1.
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# E l s e TTL i s g r e a t e r t h a n 1 , Echo Reply
e l i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . t t l > 1 :
icmp . t y p e = p k t . TYPE_ECHO_REPLY
icmp . p a y l o a d = p a c k e t . f i n d ( " icmp " ) . p a y l o a d
i p p . s r c i p = p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . d s t i p
i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . d s t i p == IPAddr ( " 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 " ) :
r e p l y _ t t l = DEFAULT_RTR_TTL
e l i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . d s t i p == IPAddr ( " 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 1 " ) :
r e p l y _ t t l = DEFAULT_RTR_TTL
e l i f p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . d s t i p == IPAddr ( " 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 " ) :
r e p l y _ t t l = DEFAULT_NIX_TTL − 1
e l s e :
icmp . t y p e = p k t . TYPE_DEST_UNREACH
icmp . code = 1
icmp . p a y l o a d = s t r u c t . pack ( ’ !HHBBHHHBBHIIBBHHH’ , icmp_unused ,
icmp_next_mtu , ( p_ in . v << 4) + p_ in . h l ,
p_ in . t o s , p_ in . i p l e n , p_ in . id ,
p_ in . f l a g s << 13) | p_ in . f r a g , p_ in . t t l ,
p_ in . p r o t o c o l , p_ in . csum ,
p_ in . s r c i p . t o U n s i g n e d ( ) ,
p_ in . d s t i p . t o U n s i g n e d ( ) ,
pp_ in . type , pp_ in . code , pp_ in . csum ,
echop . id , echop . seq )
i p p . s r c i p = IPAddr ( " 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 " )
r e p l y _ t t l = DEFAULT_RTR_TTL
Our next set of conditional checks for TTL value is fairly simple from this point as we
are only presenting one layer of depth for routers in our deception scheme. However,
depending on the depth and breadth of the deceptive topology we want to present, our
conditional checks could become much more complex. Therefore, with only one layer of
deception, we can treat all TTL values greater than 1 the same. Any packet destined to
either interface of our collapsed router (R2/R5), would receive a standard echo reply. For
any packet destined to our web server with a TTL greater than 1, we construct an echo
reply with a default Linux TTL, less the number of deception layers we are presenting. In
this case, our web server is running the Linux Operating System, which typically uses a
default TTL of 64, and since we are presenting one layer of deception, we decrement the
TTL of the echo reply by 1. Again, for probes to all other destination IP address not in the
network or deception scheme, we simply reply with an ICMP Type 3 Code 1, Destination
Unreachable, Host Unreachable, message as the last “else” statement provides.
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# C o n s t r u c t t h e IP P a c k e t f o r Reply message h e a d e r
i p p . t o s = 0 xc0
i p p . t t l = r e p l y _ t t l
i p p . p r o t o c o l = i p p . ICMP_PROTOCOL
i p p . d s t i p = p a c k e t . f i n d ( " ipv4 " ) . s r c i p
# C o n s t r u c t t h e E t h e r n e t Frame f o r Reply message h e a d e r
e = p k t . e t h e r n e t ( )
e . s r c = p a c k e t . d s t
e . d s t = p a c k e t . s r c
e . t y p e = e . IP_TYPE
# Link up p a r t s o f Reply
i p p . p a y l o a d = icmp
e . p a y l o a d = i p p
# Send Reply back t o t h e i n p u t p o r t
msg = of . o f p _ p a c k e t _ o u t ( )
msg . a c t i o n s . append ( o f . o f p _ a c t i o n _ o u t p u t ( p o r t = o f . OFPP_IN_PORT ) )
msg . d a t a = e . pack ( )
msg . i n _ p o r t = e v e n t . p o r t
e v e n t . c o n n e c t i o n . send ( msg )
After processing the ICMP Echo packet to create an associated reply consistent with the
deception we want to present, we need to construct the rest of the packet headers for the
ICMP probe response message. The two key IP header fields that we modify to provide
deception in the ICMP response packet is the source IP address and the TTL. Recall that
we conditionally set these values as “ipp.srcip” and “reply_ttl”. We set the response packet
TTL, “ipp.ttl”, equal to the conditionally set “reply_ttl” value. In addition, we ensure
the IP header indicates that the payload is an ICMP message, and set the destination IP
address of the reply message equal to the source IP address from which we received the
original probe message. One final IP header field value we need to set, to ensure the
IP header of a deceptive ICMP response message is indistinguishable from a normally
generated message, is the Type of Service field. As we discussed in §3.4, this field has
been re-designated for DSCP, though is still commonly referred to as ToS. An adversary
using various probe utilities may not immediately recognize the difference unless they were
doing a deep inspection of all probe response packets, but a normal host or router sets the
ToS field value as hex 0xC0 for ICMP error messages.
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Finally, we need to construct the Ethernet frame header for the message to be forwarded
back to the switch for processing. We swap the Ethernet source and destination MAC
address, which addresses the Ethernet frame back to the internal port of router (R1). Next
we link up the different layers of the reply message to be packaged into the Data portion
of the Ethernet frame. Then we send the frame back to the OF switch to be transmitted out
the port that the associated probe message was received on. This action is indicated by the
“of.OFPP_IN_PORT” as discussed in §3.4 and specifically listed in Table 3.4.
Even though the deception scheme we employed was relatively simple, there is a fair
amount of complexity in processing each probe packet and conditionally providing an as-
sociated response. Our Python code is probably not as efficient as it could be to optimize
the conditional checks on each packet, and we hard coded many variables and IP addresses
to build an initial proof-of-concept. We only presented one layer of deception, with two
routers virtually collapsed to represent one, and a single host in the protection scheme.
Adding additional layers of depth with more routers, and additional breadth by employing
redundant links or even load balancing between routers, would increase the complexity of
our deception scheme and the topodeception.py script. Further, we have only provided de-
ceptive responses to the simplest of three types of probe packets, ICMP. Including flow
rules and conditional checks to capture and provide deceptive responses to UDP and TCP
probes as well, would require significantly more work. We discuss all these challenges and




Our research goal was to determine if the premises of SDN and the OF protocol enables em-
ploying topology deception for network defense. In Chapter 2, we discussed several broad
network topology measurement efforts with a focus to research, as well some of those with
a more nefarious end-goal of network exploitation. We also discussed the underlying net-
work protocols and several tools that exploit those protocols to perform network mapping.
In Chapter 3, we discussed the premises of SDN and provided many of the salient features
of the OF protocol and its operation. We then applied that information in Chapter 4 in
implementing our custom SDN controller to reproduce the deceptive topology generated in
previous work [16].
In this chapter, we will utilize several of the mapping tools discussed in §2.2 to test the
results of our deceptive topology implementation. We will first provide some general ob-
servations of behavior consistent across all our tests and provide some analysis as to the
root cause of these observations. Then, we will demonstrate the normal and deceptive re-
sults from several ping utilities that probe for the presence of an end host. Last, we will
demonstrate the normal and deceptive mapping results generated from two common tracer-
oute utilities that infer the hops towards the target.
Recall from §4.1, our deception scheme focuses on providing deception to ICMP based
probes, even though many tools can also construct non-ICMP probes. Therefore, all of our
test probes in §5.2 and §5.3 use ICMP and will be initiated from the Adversary computer
in our test network as previously discussed in Chapter 4. Figure 5.1 specifically illustrates
the test network, showing the normal route that would be discovered without any form of
deception implemented, nor any network security controls implemented that would block
ICMP traffic. Figure 5.2 illustrates the inferred route that will be presented to an adver-
sarial scan with our custom SDN controller. For the deception scheme, recall that we
collapsed router (R1) and router (R5) to present a more believable hop-to-hop route based
on the addressing scheme in use. For the ping tests in §5.2 and tracroute tests in §5.3, the
probe replies in the “normal” test are from the actual nodes in the network (e.g., the host
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172.20.5.2 actually provides the response). For the “deceptive” test, with our deceptive
scheme employed, the SDN controller actually provides the reply to probes from all nodes
along the presented deceptive path as represented in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.1: The normal route discovered without deception. The solid blue arcs represent
the true route provided to the adversary in response to a traceroute probe.
Figure 5.2: The deceptive route presented with our SDN deception. The solid blue arcs
represent the true route, and the dashed red arcs represent the deceptive route provided to
the adversary, in response to a traceroute probe.
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5.1 General Observations
In all the tests conducted, with each ping and traceroute utility, we experienced what would
be considered a significant RTT for our test environment. Specifically, we will see that
the average RTT for ping tests from the adversary computer, through the normal network
topology, as represented in Figure 5.1, to the actual web server and back, is about 100
milliseconds. This delay in our test environment is significant, considering that the network
we are running the test are comprised of virtual routers and virtual computers, all on the
same host computer, with the exception of the directly connected physical OF-enabled
switch. Figure 5.3 is the actual graphic of our test environment as constructed and simulated
in GNS3. All the links between nodes in the virtual environment of GNS3 are essentially
software links to move traffic between virtual nodes. The inclusion of hubs in our test
environment was required in GNS3 to cross-link between virtual interfaces and physical
hardware interfaces, and would not be required in an actual network architecture.
Figure 5.3: Graphic of constructed test environment in GNS3.
Recall from §2.2.3, that RTT is the duration of time it takes for a response to be received
back from a probe packet. The majority of a packet’s end-to-end delay, as it traverses
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a typical network or the Internet, normally comes from propagation delay of the packet
traveling to the destination, combined with the propagation delay of the response packet
traveling back to the source. As was briefly mentioned in §2.2.3, it is this latency in packet
delivery from propagation delay that is extremely useful in many latency-based geolocation
methods. There are, however, other less significant factors that affect the overall end-to-end
delay of packets: processing delay, transmission delay, and queuing delay. We will further
expound on these four factors of end-to-end packet delay.
The speed of light in a vacuum travels at nearly 300,000 kilometers per second (186,200
miles per second), by which a signal traveling in a medium, such as copper wire or fiber
optic cable, travels at about 2/3 the speed of light, or approximately 222,000 kilometers per
second (138,000 miles per second) [83]. To determine the propagation delay of a signal,
we simply take the distance traveled divided by the propagation speed of the signal. If we
were to consider the average RTT of 100 ms for all normal probes in our end-to-end tests
as previously mentioned, and assuming the other factors of processing delay, transmission
delay, and queuing delay, are not a factor, then the propagation delay in one direction would
be about 50 ms. This propagation delay in a real-world network would be representative of
a distance of about 6900 miles in one direction; the speed of a the signal through a medium
(138,000 miles per second) multiplied by the propagation delay in one direction (50 ms).
For a comparative analysis of our test measurements, consider the rough distance from the
east coast to west coast of the U.S. is approximately 3,000 miles. The propagation delay, in
one direction, is calculated at 3000 miles divided by 138,000 miles per second, for a total
of .022 seconds (22 milliseconds). If we sent a ping from a node on one coast to a node
on the other coast to solicit a reply, the RTT would be at least 44 milliseconds, or twice the
propagation delay in one direction, having traveled a total of 6000 miles. Therefore, one
or more of the other factors of end-to-end packet delay is contributing to the delays in our
ping and traceroute measurements.
The processing delay is the time it takes for a computer or router to process the packet
headers. Given that most Internet routers just inspect a packet header to determine the best
path to forward the packet on, very little processing time should be involved. Though some
network services, such as firewalls and proxy servers, that provide more in-depth packet
inspection based on configured security policy, could provide greater processing delay.
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Transmission delay is the amount of time it takes for a node to push all of a packet’s bits on
the medium. The two factors that impact transmission delay is the size of the packet and
the data-rate of the link. Transmission delay was a significant factor in the days of dial-up
networking, but is insignificant in today’s high-speed networks. The last of the end-to-end
factors is queuing delay, which is the time a packet waits in some buffer of a switch, router,
or server, to be processed. Queuing delay can quickly become more of a factor in congested
networks and especially within a congested data center.
In an effort to determine where potential delay in packets is occurring in our test environ-
ment from Figure 5.3, we conducted an experiment where we pinged each individual hop
address from the adversary computer and from the web server, recording the average RTT
over a thousand cycles. In this experiment, our OF-enabled switch simply functioned as a
normal Ethernet switch, without any deception scheme employed. The only other traffic
that transverses our test network, other than the ICMP probes, are the single packet RIP
updates each router broadcast to its neighbor every 30 seconds. We included additional
options with our ping probes to further limit the amount of traffic queued on the interfaces.
The “-n” option was set to only output the IP address of each return so that no attempts are
made to resolve to symbolic names via DNS. To also ensure that no more one unanswered
probe was present on the network at a time, which could result in queuing on a node, we set
the “-A” option for Adaptive ping. This also allowed immediately sending the next probe
once a response was received for the previous node.
Our first test recorded the average RTT of a thousand pings from the adversary computer
at 172.20.9.100 to the first hop router (R1) at 172.20.9.1. Then recording the average RTT
from the adversary computer to the next hop router (R2) at 172.20.1.2. We continued this
process along each hop until last recording the average RTT from the adversary computer
to the web server at 172.20.5.2. We then repeated this process starting from the web server,
recording the average RTT to the first hop router (R5) at 172.20.5.1. Then recording the
average RTT from the web server to the next hop router (R4) at 172.20.4.1. Again, we
continued this process along each hop until last recording the average RTT from the web
server to the adversary computer at 172.20.9.100. Once all measurements were conducted,
we plotted the average RTT recorded from each endpoint node (adversary computer and
web server) to each hop along the path to the other endpoint node as represented in Figure
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5.4. Other than a slight dip of a few milliseconds at hop three, router (R3), when tracing
from the adversary computer, the average RTTs in both directions are essentially the same
along each hop. Therefore, no one node, or the actual physical network switch, stands out
as providing more delay than any other node. Given the constraints mentioned to ensure
only one probe was on the network at a time, and the resulting RTTs being similar to tests
later explained in §5.2, it is unlikely any delays were the result of queuing either. Also,
given that all packet transmissions are mostly done through software, with the exception of
crossing to and from the one physical switch, by which we also did not see any significant
change in hop-to-hop delay time, that the transmission delay was also likely not a factor in
our end-to-end packet delays.
Figure 5.4: Result of delay traces in virtual test environment. The switch is functioning as
a normal Ethernet switch, without any deception scheme employed.
It is therefore possible that the end-to-end delays are induced by the significant overhead of
virtual processing of packets through our test environment in GNS3. The average Central
Processing Unit (CPU) utilization of the virtual router emulator in our test environment av-
eraged 30 percent, regardless of the network traffic loading placed on the network. A probe
transiting through our normal network topology would have to pass through five virtual
routers, each adding additional delay in processing packets. For our deceptive topology,
only one virtual router is transited for probe packets, and forwarded to the controller for
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processing. We will further discuss these observations in Chapter 6.
5.2 Results from PING Utilities
One of the most basic of network diagnostic tools discussed in §2.2.3 is the PING utility,
which directs an ICMP Type 8, Echo message to a distant host to solicit an ICMP Type 0,
Echo Reply. Most Linux based ping utilities will continue to send probes until the program
is interrupted, however, for our testing purposes we limit out test to four with the “-c 4”
option set in each utility tested.
DEFAULT PING. We first test the default PING utility installed on the Linux Operating
System. Here we see the normal response to our ping probe in Figure 5.5, compared
to the deceptive response in Figure 5.6. The normal response is similar to the general
characteristics of a ping as was discussed in §2.2.3. In both, we can see that each Echo
probe sent received an associated Echo reply. With each reply, the utility calculated the
RTT and displays the TTL of the received Echo reply packet. Based on the discussion
in §4.6 regarding default operating system TTLs, combined with other endpoint analysis
tools that can be employed to fingerprint an operating system, we could assume that the
target computer is running Linux or Unix, and is approximately 5 hops away. The results
in Figure 5.5 are consistent with our normal network topology as represented in Figure 5.1.
In the deceptive response, Figure 5.6, we see the TTL is obviously different, and applying
the same assumptions, it would appear as though the target computer is only two hops
away, which would be consistent with our deceptive network topology as represented in
Figure 5.2.
# p ing −c 4 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
PING 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ) 5 6 ( 8 4 ) b y t e s o f d a t a .
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =1 t t l =59 t ime =97 .1 ms
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =2 t t l =59 t ime =95 .7 ms
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =3 t t l =59 t ime =95 .3 ms
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =4 t t l =59 t ime =92 .7 ms
−−− 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 p ing s t a t i s t i c s −−−
4 p a c k e t s t r a n s m i t t e d , 4 r e c e i v e d , 0 % p a c k e t l o s s , t ime 3006ms
r t t min / avg / max / mdev = 9 2 . 7 5 4 / 9 7 . 2 4 8 / 9 7 . 1 7 8 / 1 . 6 2 5 ms
Figure 5.5: Normal ICMP PING results with default Linux PING utility.
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# p ing −c 4 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
PING 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ) 5 6 ( 8 4 ) b y t e s o f d a t a .
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =1 t t l =62 t ime =45 .7 ms
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =2 t t l =62 t ime =62 .9 ms
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =3 t t l =62 t ime =22 .4 ms
64 b y t e s from 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : icmp_seq =4 t t l =62 t ime =10 .5 ms
−−− 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 p ing s t a t i s t i c s −−−
4 p a c k e t s t r a n s m i t t e d , 4 r e c e i v e d , 0 % p a c k e t l o s s , t ime 3003ms
r t t min / avg / max / mdev = 1 0 . 5 2 8 / 3 5 . 4 0 2 / 6 2 . 9 5 3 / 2 0 . 3 3 0 ms
Figure 5.6: Deceptive ICMP PING results with default Linux PING utility.
FPING. We now test the Fping utility against our target computer. Recall from §2.2.3 that
the Fping utility is similar to the standard Linux installed ping utility, but was developed to
enable pinging more than one computer at a time and enabled improved scripting function-
ality. Fping is limited to only using ICMP for constructing network probes. Here we see
the default response to our ping probe in Figure 5.7, compared to the deceptive response in
Figure 5.8. As in the default ping utility, we can see in both the normal and deceptive topol-
ogy, that each Echo probe sent received an associated Echo reply. However, the output is
somewhat different than the standard ping utility. Specifically, the output does not provide
the TTL or ICMP sequence number of the response packets. In addition to displaying the
RTT for each response, it calculates and displays the running RTT average. On the surface,
the Fping utility does not provide any better detail than the standard ping utility.
# f p i n g −c 4 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : [ 0 ] , 84 b y t e s , 9 2 . 8 ms ( 9 2 . 8 avg , 0 % l o s s )
1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : [ 1 ] , 84 b y t e s , 9 2 . 4 ms ( 9 2 . 6 avg , 0 % l o s s )
1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : [ 2 ] , 84 b y t e s , 9 5 . 6 ms ( 9 3 . 6 avg , 0 % l o s s )
1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : [ 3 ] , 84 b y t e s , 9 8 . 4 ms ( 9 4 . 8 avg , 0 % l o s s )
1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : xmt / r c v / %l o s s = 4 / 4 / 0 %, min / avg / max = 9 2 . 4 / 9 4 . 8 / 9 8 . 4
Figure 5.7: Normal ICMP PING results with the Fping utility.
# f p i n g −c 4 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : [ 0 ] , 84 b y t e s , 3 9 . 5 ms ( 3 9 . 5 avg , 0 % l o s s )
1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : [ 1 ] , 84 b y t e s , 2 5 . 8 ms ( 3 2 . 7 avg , 0 % l o s s )
1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : [ 2 ] , 84 b y t e s , 3 7 . 3 ms ( 3 4 . 2 avg , 0 % l o s s )
1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : [ 3 ] , 84 b y t e s , 5 5 . 8 ms ( 3 9 . 6 avg , 0 % l o s s )
1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : xmt / r c v / %l o s s = 4 / 4 / 0 %, min / avg / max = 2 5 . 8 / 3 9 . 6 / 5 5 . 8
Figure 5.8: Deceptive ICMP PING results with the Fping utility.
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HPING. Next, we use the Hping utility against our target computer. We briefly mentioned
the Hping utility in §2.2.3 when discussing various ping utilities. A key distinction from the
default ping and Fping utility, is that Hping can perform probes with TCP, UDP, Raw-IP,
in addition to ICMP. As such, we add an additional option to specify use of ICMP with the
“-1” option. Here we see the default response to our ping probe in Figure 5.9, compared to
the deceptive response in Figure 5.10. The output of ICMP Hping probes is nearly identical
to the output of the default ping utility in Figure 5.5. With each reply, the utility calculated
the RTT and displays the TTL of the received Echo reply packet.
Hping also presents the “id” field from the IP header of the Echo reply packet, known as
the Internet Protocol Identification (IPID). Recall in §3.4, the IP header as represented
in Figure 3.3, which represents this field as the identification field. This field is used for
datagram fragmentation and reassembly, but is often employed by tools for fingerprinting.
Every computer and router implements an internal counter, which is incremented for each
packet sent generated and sent. In the normal topology, it would appear that the end host
increments the IPID field by a value of one for each packet. In the deceptive topology, the
end host appears to increment the identification by a value of two for each packet. Though
this incremental value by two as compared to the normal topology response does appear a
bit odd, the adversary would only receive the deceptive response with the deception scheme
employed, and therefore may not appear significant. The results in Figure 5.9 are consistent
with our normal network topology as represented in Figure 5.1. And in the deceptive
response, Figure 5.10, we see the TTL is consistent with the results in Figure 5.6, and with
our deceptive network topology as represented in Figure 5.2.
# hp ing3 −c 4 −1 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
HPING 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ( e t h 1 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ) icmp mode s e t , 28 h e a d e r s + 0 d a t a b y t e s
l e n =46 i p = 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 t t l =59 i d =17038 icmp_seq =0 r t t =108 .7 ms
l e n =46 i p = 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 t t l =59 i d =17039 icmp_seq =1 r t t =98 .5 ms
l e n =46 i p = 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 t t l =59 i d =17040 icmp_seq =2 r t t =103 .9 ms
l e n =46 i p = 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 t t l =59 i d =17041 icmp_seq =3 r t t =96 .1 ms
−−− 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 hp ing s t a t i s t i c −−−
4 p a c k e t s t r a n s m i t t e d , 4 r e c e i v e d , 0% p a c k e t l o s s
round− t r i p min / avg / max / = 9 6 . 1 / 1 0 1 . 8 / 1 0 8 . 7 ms
Figure 5.9: Normal ICMP PING results with the Hping utility.
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# hp ing3 −c 4 −1 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
HPING 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ( e t h 1 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ) icmp mode s e t , 28 h e a d e r s + 0 d a t a b y t e s
l e n =46 i p = 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 t t l =62 i d =48619 icmp_seq =0 r t t =26 .0 ms
l e n =46 i p = 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 t t l =62 i d =48621 icmp_seq =1 r t t =47 .3 ms
l e n =46 i p = 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 t t l =62 i d =48623 icmp_seq =2 r t t =27 .1 ms
l e n =46 i p = 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 t t l =62 i d =48625 icmp_seq =3 r t t =47 .6 ms
−−− 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 hp ing s t a t i s t i c −−−
4 p a c k e t s t r a n s m i t t e d , 4 r e c e i v e d , 0% p a c k e t l o s s
round− t r i p min / avg / max / = 2 6 . 0 / 3 7 . 0 / 4 7 . 6 ms
Figure 5.10: Deceptive ICMP PING results with the Hping utility.
NPING. Last, we employ the Nping utility against our target computer. Like the Hping
utility, Nping can perform probes with TCP, UDP, and Raw-IP, in addition to ICMP.
Therefore, we must also specify in the command syntax the protocol option to use, by
which we pass Nping the “–icmp” option for our testing purposes. Here we see the default
response to our ping probe in Figure 5.11, compared to the deceptive response in Figure
5.12. Recall from 2.2.3, Nping has a unique feature called “Echo Mode” to provide ad-
vanced troubleshooting and discovery so users can see how packets change in transit with-
out the use of packet capture utilities for in-depth packet comparison. Part of this “mode”
is represented by the addition of not only information about the received packet, but also
some information regarding the probe packet that solicited the response packet.
Clearly the output format is very different than that of the other utilities used. Nping, much
like Hping, has a long list of selectable options to customize and tweak network probe
packets as it is more in-tune for network penetration testing than just a simple network
diagnostic utility. Like Hping, Nping also presents the “id” field from the IP header of the
Echo reply packet. In the normal topology, it would appear that the end host increments
the identification field by a value of one for each packet. In the deceptive topology, the
end host appears to increment the identification by a value of two for each packet. We saw
similar results with the Hping utility as well. In addition, we can see Nping uses the same
“ipid” for each probe message sent to the target, and therefore, would not use this field for
uniquely identifying individual probe messages.
Nping also has additional options to provide even further details than what is represented
below. In fact, the default output line was so long, that we truncated a portion of its output
to fit the width of the page. The “<t/c>” in each SENT and RCVD line represents the reg-
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istered ICMP Type and Code from the packets in the probes. In both normal and deceptive
topology probes, all the SENT probe’s “<t/c>” values were (type=8/code=0), for a typi-
cal Echo request; and all the RCVD responses “<t/c>” values were (type=0/code=0), for a
typical Echo reply. On further inspection, the overall information obtained from an Nping
probe is the same as the other utilities, only that Nping displays more of the underlying
packet information to the user. We see in Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12, that the TTLs and
RTTs are similar to the default ping and Hping utilities, and consistent with the network
topology in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, respectfully.
# np ing −c 4 −−icmp 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
S t a r t i n g Nping 0 . 5 . 5 1 ( h t t p : / / nmap . o rg / np ing ) a t 2014−02−28 08 :51 PST
SENT ( 0 . 0 0 1 5 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 Echo r e q u e s t < t / c> t t l =64 i d =65389 i p l e n =28
RCVD ( 0 . 1 0 4 8 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 Echo r e p l y < t / c> t t l =59 i d =17042 i p l e n =28
SENT ( 1 . 0 0 2 2 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 Echo r e q u e s t < t / c> t t l =64 i d =65389 i p l e n =28
RCVD ( 1 . 0 9 4 6 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 Echo r e p l y < t / c> t t l =59 i d =17043 i p l e n =28
SENT ( 2 . 0 0 4 4 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 Echo r e q u e s t < t / c> t t l =64 i d =65389 i p l e n =28
RCVD ( 2 . 1 0 4 4 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 Echo r e p l y < t / c> t t l =59 i d =17044 i p l e n =28
SENT ( 3 . 0 0 7 5 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 Echo r e q u e s t < t / c> t t l =64 i d =65389 i p l e n =28
RCVD ( 3 . 1 0 7 4 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 Echo r e p l y < t / c> t t l =59 i d =17045 i p l e n =28
Max r t t : 103 .187 ms | Min r t t : 92 .164 ms | Avg r t t : 98 .340 ms
Raw p a c k e t s s e n t : 4 (112B) | Rcvd : 4 (184B) | Los t : 0 ( 0 . 0 0 %)
Tx t ime : 3 .00627 s | Tx b y t e s / s : 37 .26 | Tx p k t s / s : 1 . 3 3
Rx t ime : 4 .00836 s | Rx b y t e s / s : 45 .90 | Rx p k t s / s : 1 . 0 0
Nping done : 1 IP a d d r e s s p in ged i n 4 . 0 1 s e c o n d s
Figure 5.11: Normal ICMP PING results with the Nping utility.
# np ing −c 4 −−icmp 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
S t a r t i n g Nping 0 . 5 . 5 1 ( h t t p : / / nmap . o rg / np ing ) a t 2014−02−28 08 :54 PST
SENT ( 0 . 0 0 1 4 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 Echo r e q u e s t < t / c> t t l =64 i d =41803 i p l e n =28
RCVD ( 0 . 0 3 7 7 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 Echo r e p l y < t / c> t t l =62 i d =48824 i p l e n =28
SENT ( 1 . 0 0 1 9 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 Echo r e q u e s t < t / c> t t l =64 i d =41803 i p l e n =28
RCVD ( 1 . 0 6 3 2 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 Echo r e p l y < t / c> t t l =62 i d =48826 i p l e n =28
SENT ( 2 . 0 0 3 3 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 Echo r e q u e s t < t / c> t t l =64 i d =41803 i p l e n =28
RCVD ( 2 . 0 3 4 9 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 Echo r e p l y < t / c> t t l =62 i d =48828 i p l e n =28
SENT ( 3 . 0 0 5 1 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 Echo r e q u e s t < t / c> t t l =64 i d =41803 i p l e n =28
RCVD ( 3 . 0 5 7 8 s ) ICMP 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 > 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 Echo r e p l y < t / c> t t l =62 i d =48830 i p l e n =28
Max r t t : 61 .13 ms | Min r t t : 31 .398 ms | Avg r t t : 45 .238 ms
Raw p a c k e t s s e n t : 4 (112B) | Rcvd : 4 (184B) | Los t : 0 ( 0 . 0 0 %)
Tx t ime : 3 .00402 s | Tx b y t e s / s : 37 .28 | Tx p k t s / s : 1 . 3 3
Rx t ime : 4 .00562 s | Rx b y t e s / s : 45 .94 | Rx p k t s / s : 1 . 0 0
Nping done : 1 IP a d d r e s s p in ged i n 4 . 0 1 s e c o n d s
Figure 5.12: Deceptive ICMP PING results with the Nping utility.
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5.3 Results from Traceroute Utilities
The various ping utilities we tested, all represented our normal and deceptive topology as
expected in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, respectfully. However, since we are only sending
probes to and getting responses from an endpoint node, we can only infer the number of
hops between our test node and the endpoint node. To gain detailed knowledge of the
actual intermediate nodes along the path to the target endpoint node, we must use various
traceroute utilities as discussed in §2.2.4. Again, since our focus is on ICMP, we will
send ICMP Type 8, Echo messages to solicit ICMP Type 0, Echo Replies. Traceroute
utilities differ from ping utilities by manipulating the TTL to solicit ICMP Type 11, Code
1, Destination Unreachable / Time Exceeded in Transit, messages from those intermediate
nodes, or routers, along the path to our target.
Traceroute utilities, like ping utilities, provide many different options to manipulate the
way in which the probe messages are constructed, and how the results are output to the
user. A typical default function of traceroute utilities is to attempt to resolve the IP address
of each hop to a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). Since our test environment does
not employ DNS services to perform this resolution, we include the “-n” option to prevent
this function. This also does not impact the deception scheme, though inclusion of decep-
tive DNS entries could further enhance the believability of the deceptive scheme. Linux
and Unix traceroute utilities typically use UDP by default for performing traces, unless
otherwise specified with various options. Therefore, include the “-I” option with the de-
fault traceroute utility, and “-p icmp” for the paris-traceroute utility, to specify use of ICMP
for all traces. As a reminder when review the traceroute tests, since our goal is presenting
a deceptive topology to network probes, the issues with RTT in our test environment as
discussed in §5.1.
DEFAULT TRACEROUTE. We first test the default Linux traceroute utility installed on
the Adversary computer in our test environment. Here we see the normal response to
our trace in Figure 5.13, compared to the deceptive response in Figure 5.14. The normal
response is similar to the general characteristics of a trace as was discussed in Figure 2.2
in §2.2.4. With each set of three probes, sent at each TTL value starting with one, we are
able to discover the individual router hops along the path to the destination. With each TTL
value, the default traceroute program also displays the calculated RTT of each individual
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probe. The results in Figure 5.13 for the normal topology is consistent with the number
of hops inferred from our previous ping tests, and is representative of the normal topology
illustrated in Figure 5.1. The target of our traceroute is exactly five hops away, with the
sixth hop being the target node itself. The results in Figure 5.14 for the deceptive topology
also confirms the number of hops inferred from previous ping tests, and is representative of
the deceptive topology illustrated in Figure 5.2. The target of our traceroute, through the
deception employed, is presented to the adversary as being precisely two hops away, with
the third hop being the target node itself.
# t r a c e r o u t e −n −I 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
t r a c e r o u t e t o 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ) , 30 hops max , 60 b y t e p a c k e t s
1 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 4 .208 ms 14 .621 ms 25 .879 ms
2 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 35 .194 ms 45 .171 ms 55 .203 ms
3 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 2 . 2 75 .661 ms 85 .658 ms 95 .785 ms
4 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 3 . 2 125 .983 ms 136 .170 ms 146 .508 ms
5 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 4 . 2 179 .490 ms 187 .817 ms 198 .527 ms
6 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 218 .498 ms 226 .512 ms 226 .185 ms
Figure 5.13: Normal ICMP Traceroute results with default traceroute utility.
# t r a c e r o u t e −n −I 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
t r a c e r o u t e t o 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 ) , 30 hops max , 60 b y t e p a c k e t s
1 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 3 .322 ms 13 .114 ms 23 .663 ms
2 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 33 .626 ms 43 .575 ms 53 .277 ms
3 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 63 .661 ms 73 .182 ms 84 .500 ms
Figure 5.14: Deceptive ICMP Traceroute results with default traceroute utility.
PARIS-TRACEROUTE. We next test the paris-traceroute utility that was briefly men-
tioned in §2.2.4, and further discussed in §2.3.1. Here we see the normal response to
our trace in Figure 5.15, compared to the deceptive response in Figure 5.16. Again, with
each set of three probes, sent at each TTL value starting with one, we are able to discover
the individual nodes along the path to the destination. And, with each TTL value, paris-
traceroute displays the calculated RTT of each individual probe. The results in Figure 5.15
for the normal topology is similar to the results from the default traceroute utility in Figure
5.13, and hence is representative of the normal topology illustrated in Figure 5.1. As well,
the results in Figure 5.16 for the deceptive topology is similar to the results from the de-
fault traceroute utility in Figure 5.14, and hence is representative of the deceptive topology
illustrated in Figure 5.2.
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# p a r i s− t r a c e r o u t e −n −p icmp 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
t r a c e r o u t e [ ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 : 3 3 4 5 6 ) −> ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : 3 3 4 5 7 ) ] , p r o t o c o l icmp , d u r a t i o n 1 s
1 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 2 .356 ms 3 .159 ms 2 .174 ms
2 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 22 .224 ms 22 .861 ms 22 .595 ms
3 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 2 . 2 44 .080 ms 44 .065 ms 45 .204 ms
4 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 3 . 2 65 .081 ms 66 .364 ms 65 .341 ms
5 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 4 . 2 90 .946 ms 90 .890 ms 90 .899 ms
6 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 101 .326 ms 101 .330 ms 102 .55 ms
Figure 5.15: Normal ICMP Traceroute results with paris-traceroute utility.
# p a r i s− t r a c e r o u t e −n −p icmp 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
t r a c e r o u t e [ ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 : 3 3 4 5 6 ) −> ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : 3 3 4 5 7 ) ] , p r o t o c o l icmp , d u r a t i o n 1 s
1 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 5 .787 ms 5 .686 ms 5 .479 ms
2 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 35 .811 ms 29 .301 ms 49 .289 ms
3 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 28 .939 ms 49 .726 ms 29 .936 ms
Figure 5.16: Deceptive ICMP Traceroute results with paris-traceroute utility.
5.4 General Assessment of Deception Scheme
On the surface, our deception scheme employed through SDN and the OF protocol appear
to present a believable deceptive topology. The various ping and traceroute utilities run
against the test network with ICMP all appear to accurately map the normal network topol-
ogy. Additionally, these utilities all generally appear to accurately represent the intended
deceptive topology employed though our deception scheme. Therefore, it would appear
that employing our scheme in a normal network environment, avoid of the RTT issues
from the virtual environment, would deceive an adversary as to the true topology of the
network when employing ICMP-based utilities.
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CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we demonstrated that SDN and the OF protocol provide several benefits to
employing topology deception through a proof-of-concept SDN network controller. For
example, the centralized controller permits agility. Any changes made to the deception
scheme are easily implemented in the SDN controller and deployed through a simple
restart, thereby pushing the new policy to the network. No software or hardware upgrades
are required to dynamically change the deception functionality. However, our solution is
still a work-in-progress and many issues remain to be resolved to move towards a full-
scale, ready-to-deploy, enterprise solution. This chapter details some of the weakness in
the overall deception scheme, provides some potential alternative approaches to employing
the deception, and discusses potential avenues for future work.
6.1 Weaknesses in Deception Scheme
There are certainly many weaknesses in our present deception implementation, some of
which are fundamental and some are implementation-specific. We further acknowledge
that some weaknesses may remain unidentified in this thesis. For those identified, some will
be easier to correct than others. To move towards construction of a more robust, enterprise-
grade deceptive topology solution, these weaknesses must be addressed. We will discuss
two of these major weaknesses, one discovered from previous work [16] and one more
inherent in the current standards of the OF protocol.
6.1.1 Weakness of a Central Node
In §2.3.2, we discussed some general differences between low-interaction and high-
interaction honeypots. Low-interaction honeypots generally only provide some basic level
of faked services for intentional deception. Further investigation by an experienced ad-
versary, employing the right tools against low-interaction honeypots, and with the correct
analysis, could uncover that some type of deception scheme was employed.
The initial work [16] on deceptive dynamic network topology that we are building on could
still be considered a type of low-level deception scheme. The work discussed some criteria
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that the topological deception must satisfy to be successful; the first is that the deception
presented must be “believable.” From the results of our test in Chapter 5, using four dif-
ferent ping utilities and two different traceroute utilities, the deception is believable and
easily deceives large-scale automated probing. Security researchers, research groups, on
the other-hand would probably be able to figure out the deception. And an adversary who
is focused particularly on gaining access to and exploiting the defended network, would
quickly uncover the current deception scheme through more detailed, focused scans and
analysis.
In all the scans we conducted with the various tools, we only employed the default options
to get our results. But as previously mentioned, many of these tools have additional options
that can be set to further manipulate the probe packets, or display more details of the results
from the probes. The paris-traceroute tool has a “-i” option to display the IPID for each
individual probe when conducting a scan. Some of the ping utilities tested in §5.2, also
presented the IPID with each probe, but the results from those ping tests are consistent
with normal responses from a single node, even with the deceptive topology.
In Figure 6.1, we show the same scan with the paris-traceroute utility as was illustrated in
Figure 5.15, but this time set the option to display the IPID of each probe displayed. To
an inexperienced person, the below results may not seem unusual, however, to someone
experienced in network traffic analysis, the results shown below would seem unusual. As
mentioned in §5.2, each router maintains an internal counter that is incremented for each
packet it originates, but does not count those it forwards [84]. This includes replies to
pings and traceroutes, sending routing protocol route updates to neighbor routers, providing
flow data for network management, and for interactive terminal access by administrators.
# p a r i s− t r a c e r o u t e −n − i −p icmp 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
t r a c e r o u t e [ ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 : 3 3 4 5 6 ) −> ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : 3 3 4 5 7 ) ] , p r o t o c o l icmp , d u r a t i o n 1 s
1 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 2 .356 ms {334} 3 .159 ms {335} 2 .174 ms {336}
2 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 22 .224 ms {275} 22 .861 ms {276} 22 .595 ms {277}
3 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 2 . 2 44 .080 ms {401} 44 .065 ms {402} 45 .204 ms {403}
4 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 3 . 2 65 .081 ms {277} 66 .364 ms {278} 65 .341 ms {279}
5 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 4 . 2 90 .946 ms {276} 90 .890 ms {277} 90 .899 ms {278}
6 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 101 .326 ms {17077} 101 .330 ms {17078} 102 .55 ms {17079}
Figure 6.1: Normal ICMP Traceroute results with paris-traceroute utility, adding the option
to display IPID.
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It would seem unlikely for several routers in a network to all have near identical IPID
numbers, though unique conditions could establish such results. In our test network, all
the virtual routers are from the same vendor IOS, and hence all started up at the same time
when the test network was brought online. Adding the fact that we are not introducing any
additional traffic into the network beyond our normal end-to-end ping and traceroute tests,
there is little chance for the router IPIDs to diverge. The probability of an actual production
network exhibiting similar indications is likely very low, unless a group of routers in a
network was recently restarted, and that vendor’s product initializes the counter for the
IPID from a deterministic low number, or zero, vice a random number. However, even is
such a scenario, those routers’ IPID would probably diverge quickly.
The results of the paris-traceroute probe with the IPID option set, as illustrated in Figure
6.2, with our deception scheme employed, is even more interesting. The results of this scan
would quickly raise a red flag with an experienced network traffic analyst or experienced
hacker. The probability of a host computer, when conducting a trace to that host, exhibiting
an IPID that immediately follows the same incrementing pattern sequence as the router one
hop previous, is highly unlikely. Such results would likely attract further scans and probes
in attempts to fingerprint each node, and could tip an adversary that some form of deception
was employed, as it would appear that the node at hop two and three were the same.
# p a r i s− t r a c e r o u t e −n − i −p icmp 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2
t r a c e r o u t e [ ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 0 0 : 3 3 4 5 6 ) −> ( 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 : 3 3 4 5 7 ) ] , p r o t o c o l icmp , d u r a t i o n 1 s
1 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 9 . 1 5 .787 ms {416} 5 .686 ms {417} 5 .479 ms {418}
2 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 1 . 2 35 .811 ms {51152} 29 .301 ms {51154} 49 .289 ms {51156}
3 1 7 2 . 2 0 . 5 . 2 28 .939 ms {51158} 49 .726 ms {51160} 29 .936 ms {51162}
Figure 6.2: Deceptive ICMP Traceroute results with paris-traceroute utility, adding the
option to display IPID.
To better evaluate these two IP addresses, an adversary can employ alias resolution tech-
niques in attempts to determine if they are the same node. According to Keys [85], there
are generally two ways of classifying alias resolution techniques: fingerprinting techniques
and analytical techniques. The most effective method to further exploit the unusual obser-
vations with the IPID in Figure 6.2, is to use an analytical technique to better determine
if they are from the same node. According to Keys, two addresses can be inferred to be
aliases if they have similar and constant IP velocities, and the ID value in every response
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from one address is similar to the interpolated ID value of the other address at the same
time. This is because a multi-homed server or a router will typically use a single IPID
counter shared by all ports. Though from an adversarial standpoint, determining with a
high degree of confidence that these two IP address are from the same node, would still be
quite confusing considering one is apparently a web server and the other represented as a
router. The web server would easily be identified by DNS records, though many network
routers also have associated DNS records to identify its FQDN. Implementing deceptive
DNS entires would complement the overall deceptive scheme to make it more believable
to an adversary.
To conduct our analytical test of these two IP address, we use a simple script that alternates
pinging each IP address over a sufficient duration of time or number of iterations, to develop
enough data to plot and evaluate the results. For our specific script, we simply alternate
pinging both hosts over an iterative period of one thousand times. We run a packet capture
utility to record all the probe messages and associated responses. We then export from the
capture file ICMP response messages with relative time and IPID. From the filtered results,
we can plot the IPID velocity versus time for both IP addresses as represented in Figure 6.3.
Here we see that the IPID velocities for both IP address have the same vectors. We saw from
Figure 6.3: Result of IPID testing to deceptive nodes.
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Figure 6.2, that the IPID in the trace at hop two and three, incremented in even numbers by a
value of two. The underlying data captured for generating Figure 6.3 precisely followed this
same incremental sequence. Given the results of this experiment, an adversary would easily
conclude, with a high degree of confidence, that the IP address 172.20.1.2 and 172.20.5.2
were logically associated in some way with the same node, which is odd, since traceroute
indicated that they were different hops, potentially revealing the deception.
In our initial SDN deception design, we did not at first consider the need of obfuscating
IPID responses. It was not until testing the paris-traceroute utility with additional display
options, did we discover this issue. However, this discovery could technically be performed
from any ping or traceroute utility, and manually conducting a in-depth review of the cap-
tured results, and eventually noting the IPID of the responses. Therefore, to obviously
present a higher level deception scheme, future work will require implementing additional
methods to control use of IPIDs in deceptive nodes, to prevent discovery of a central control
node.
6.1.2 Weakness of OpenFlow
We discussed SDN and the OF protocol at length in Chapter 3. In §3.4, we specifically dis-
cussed the many details of the OF switch specification to include the fields that OF matches
can be constructed with to set flow policy on a switch. Our deceptive implementation ini-
tially focused on ICMP probes as we only have to conduct a match on the protocol number
for ICMP traffic to flag packets for processing.
Previous work [16] focused initially on providing deceptive responses to UDP probe traf-
fic. Any robust deceptive topology solution employed would have to effectively provide
deceptive responses to both ICMP and UDP probe traffic. In addition, it must correctly
identifying TCP probe traffic over legitimate TCP traffic, and provide deceptive response
to the TCP probes as well. Recall from §2.2.4, that UDP ports 33434 through 33534 are
IANA registered for traceroute use. Traceroute utilities that use UDP to conduct a trace,
increment the port number starting from 33434 for each probe packet sent. To screen UDP
packets for the presence of normally constructed UDP probes, compared to UDP packets
carrying legitimate network traffic, we have 101 separate port numbers to also conduct a
match for, in addition to matching for the UDP protocol. The challenge in this, as also
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discussed in §3.4, is that we cannot specify a transport port range in a flow rule by current
OF switch standards. Therefore, to screen for UDP probes for processing and providing
deceptive responses, we must create 101 separate flow rules, one for each port number
33434 through 33534. This should not be too difficult to construct the rule sets with OF
for particularly matching on the traceroute UDP ports. A simple “for” loop, starting from
the first port number of 33434, and iterating through to port number 33534, can be used to
set each flow rule on the switch. There are no dedicated port numbers for TCP probes, as
is with UDP probes, which presents a challenge on how to differentiate TCP probes from
legitimate TCP network traffic?
Another weakness with OF with respect to our ability to implement deception, is that we
must send all identified probes to the controller for processing and generation of deceptive
responses. As we previously discussed, a typical router will screen an incoming packet’s
TTL, and if that packet’s TTL is equal to one and not destined for a port on that router,
then the TTL is decremented, the packet dropped, and an ICMP Time Exceeded message
is generated from the router and sent back to the source of the dropped packet. The OF
protocol does not provide the ability generate conditional response messages directly from
an OF-enabled switch. Most limiting with OF in regards to deceiving topology mapping
from various traceroute utilities, is the inability to match on TTL values, as expiring TTLs
is what triggers the needed message for traceroute to build its trace.
6.2 Alternate Approaches
There are potentially numerous different approaches that can be taken in implementing a
dynamic deceptive network topology, beyond what we have presented here. Some alter-
nate approaches may be more practical and effective than others. In high traffic networks,
continued work at quickly processing large amounts of packets at the kernel level, vice
user level with an SDN controller, may potentially be a better approach. Others may argue
for implementing the deception with an entire virtual overlay network, however, such an
implementation could incur the same delay issues as our test network had, as discussed in
§5.1. We advocate another potential option that can continue to build on the initial work
from this thesis in employing an SDN solution.
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Any robust deceptive topology solution employed would have to effectively provide de-
ceptive responses to both ICMP, UDP and TCP probe traffic. Regardless of the protocol
type of incoming probe traffic, they all would solicit a limited range of ICMP responses. A
better alternate approach may be to simply allow all probe traffic to enter the network, and
instead filter and manipulate the outgoing ICMP responses to those probes to present our
deceptive topology. The potential challenge in this approach is that we could not implement
a deception scheme that presents more fake hops to a network resource than the number
in the true path. An adversary could simply compare the response times from legitimate
service request to the protected server, compared to that of various traces of the network
path to the server. If the server responses are faster than the responses along the path to the
server, then the adversary would learn that some form of deception was in use.
6.3 Future Work
We highlighted some of the weaknesses and potential alternate approaches to the work con-
ducted in this thesis. Some of these must be addressed to provide a more robust deceptive
topology scheme. Other weakness, such as the limited field match options, may simply
never change in future OF switch standards, requiring working within those limits. All of
which provides room for additional development, and there are many other potential areas
for future development to this work as well. Any deceptive topology solution must take into
consideration the wide range of network mapping efforts, some of which was discussed in
Chapter 2.
6.3.1 Building upon the POX SDN Controller
We briefly mentioned some of the challenges and limitations of our methodology in Chapter
3. The code written to implement our POX SDN OF controller was done with a focus
towards functionality in developing a proof-of-concept, and not with efficiently in mind.
Many of the variables and the IP addresses of our deceptive nodes were all hard coded
instead of taking a more modular approach to programming. We also only implemented
one level of depth in our deceptive topology, which provided some level of complexity in
following our code. To follow the same method used implementing additional depth in the
deceptive topology with more routers, would be highly inefficient. In §3.2, we discussed
the concept of logical layers in the SDN architecture, in which applications would sit on top
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of the SDN controller itself. Future work could further modularize our custom controller
to handle the basics of packets in with the controller, and through an API, interface the
deception topology application module to scan the actual network topology, and build an
optimized deceptive topology from that scan.
As discussed in §5.1, we observed significant RTTs from running our controller in a com-
pletely virtualized test network, that would not be representative of an actual network. As
such, we did not code in any additional delays in the sending of deceptive responses to
probe messages. This presents a weakness in our specific implementation that must be ad-
dressed along with the issue of a common IPID as discussed in §6.1.1. To further make the
deception scheme more believable to adversary probes, additional response packet delay
times must be used that are consistent with the intended depth representation of the decep-
tive topology. To then validate the model of the deception scheme, future researchers may
consider building a test network from completely separate physical equipment to eliminate
any potential induced issues from a virtual test environment.
6.3.2 Other SDN Controllers
Our choice of SDN controller, as discussed in §4.4, was primary due to our familiarity with
the Python programming language and the ease of implementing the POX controller. The
POX controller library, though limited to OF switch specification 1.0.0, with some exten-
sions to enable certain features of higher level specifications, is fairly easy to work with.
Its development is still community-driven with a focus towards research and education
purposes. However, with limited community work in seeking to further the development
of the POX library, its potential for use in constructing high grade enterprise SDN con-
troller applications is also limited. After having done some development with the POX
SDN controller, and while gathering additional background information on the scope of
SDN controllers, we came across the Ryu [86] python-based controller, also listed in Table
3.1. The Ryu SDN framework claims to support all OF switch specifications, including the
latest version 1.4.0 [87]. This latest version has expanded the OF matchable fields from the
initial 12 in the first specification, to a total of 41 OF matchable fields. Researchers with a
preference for the Python programming language and desiring to further explore the latest
features of the OF protocol to implement a deceptive topology, may wish to use the Ryu
SDN controller. Though the latest version of the OF specification still does not include the
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TTL field of an IP packet as a matchable field.
As shown in §3.3, there are many other SDN controllers in various stages of development,
with various levels of support. Different SDN controllers are written in different program-
ming languages, and some may offer access to a richer set of library classes for developing
a custom SDN controller for topology deception than others. As well, some SDN con-
trollers have major vendor backing that could provide a more matured baseline to build
a modularized deception topology application on top of, and a larger community of sup-
port for help in development. Additionally, some of these controllers may support newer
OF switch specifications, from which some of the major changes, as highlighted in Ap-
pendix A, could enable improved functionality or implementation methods for presenting
a deceptive topology through SDN and the OF protocol. The latest switch firmware release,
version WB.15.14.0002, that we loaded into on our switch in our test network, as described
in §4.5, added support for OF Switch Specification 1.3.0 [88]. It would be interesting to see
if any of these changes in the OF switch specification can be exploited to further improve
on the development of a deceptive topology SDN controller.
6.3.3 UDP and TCP Probes
As we mentioned several times throughout this thesis, any robust solution must be able
to provide deceptive responses to ICMP, UDP and TCP probes. Though we highlighted
a weakness of the OF protocol in §6.1.2 with regard to limits on matching UDP probes,
it is not impossible to implement deception to UDP probes. Though much more efficient
methods of coding the custom SDN controller as mentioned in §6.3.1 should be considered,
regardless of the choice of baseline SDN controller to build from. The largest challenge
may be in properly detecting TCP probes, as they can be constructed the same as normal
TCP traffic.
6.3.4 Multi-Ingress Networks
Given that an SDN controller is capable of managing more than one OF-enabled switch,
implementation in a multi-ingress network is not entirely impossible. Since much remains
to be resolved in just providing a believable deceptive topology at a single ingress point,
and doing so with SDN and the OF protocol, we chose to narrow our scope. Therefore, we
focused our efforts in first implementing a solution for a single ingress point, which can
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later be improved upon and scaled to protect a multi-ingress network.
However, for a deceptive topology to be completely believable, the results of probes
through each ingress point of the network to be protected must complement each other.
One method could be to separately implement a stand-alone solution at each ingress point.
But not fully implementing an SDN solution with a centralized management node to simul-
taneously manage the deceptive policy at each ingress point, fails to fully take advantage of
the basic premises of SDN and the OF protocol. Additional challenges must be overcome
in deploying such a distributed solution if the various ingress points are geographically
separated, in which the consideration of controller placement must be evaluated for the
deceptive solution. If we have multiple ingress points to a large network, say in Washing-
ton DC, San Antonio, TX, and San Diego, CA, and if we centralize a single controller in
St. Louis, MO, all probe packets must be sent to the centralized controller for processing,
increasing the overall time to provide a deceptive reply to a probe. Therefore, for a cen-
tralized management solution, we would need to create a tiered controller structure, where
a master controller directs policy to regional controllers at each ingress point. Some previ-
ous research on The Controller Placement Problem [89] has already generally explored the
issue of geographically separated nodes, and could be a good starting point for researchers
who wish to expand a deceptive solution to manage a multi-ingress network. As work
matures on efficiently implementing deceptive dynamic network topology through SDN
and with OF protocol, researchers should strive to ensure a solution capable of scaling to




Specification Version Major changes
(date)
1.0.0 - multiple queues per output port
(Dec. 31, 2009) - flows use and referenced by opaque identifier (cookie)
- include switch description field (OFPST_DESC)
- match IP fields in ARP packets
- match IP ToS / DSCP bits
1.0.1 Errata - clarify: table-miss actions
(Jun. 7, 2012) - clarify: switch port enumeration must start with port number 1
- clarify: no padding of error messages
- clarify: properly ignoring fields in packet match
- clarify: use of flow removed messages
- clarify: virtual ports not allowed for input port
- clarify: fail-secure and fail-standalone modes of operation
1.0.2 Errata RC1 - TCP port changed from 6633 to 6653 for switch-to-controller
transport OF communication
(Oct. 4, 2013) (note: TCP 6633 was never registered with the IANA for OF use
and was allocated by IANA for other services)
1.1.0 - support for pipelining with multiple tables
(Feb. 28, 2011) - instructions in flow entries to control pipeline processing
- allows multiple options for table-miss
- reference group of ports for multicasting
- improved VLAN support
- add Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) support
- change port number to 32 bits to support virtual ports
- maskable datalink and network address match fields
- add TTL decrement, set and copy actions for IPv4 and MPLS
- add ECN action
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1.2 - IPv6 support added
(Dec. 5 2011) - change many static fields to a Type-Length-value (TLV) format,
called OpenFlow Extensible Match (OXM)
- numerous other extensions for more granular control
1.3.0 - improved description of table capabilities
(Jun. 25, 2012) - further changed table-miss behavior
- added IPv6 extension header handling support
- per controller connection event filtering
- auxiliary switch-to-controller connections
- numerous other extensions for more granular control
1.3.1 - improved OF version negotiation for switch-to-controller con-
nections
(Sept. 6, 2012) - numerous modifications and clarifications to extensions
1.3.2 - allows connection initiation from a controller
(Apr. 25, 2013) - several modifications and clarifications to extensions
1.3.3 - updated with IANA registered TCP port 6653
(Dec. 18, 2013) - extensive list of modifications and clarifications to extensions
1.4.0 - further conversion of static fields to a TLV format as part of
OXM
(Oct. 15, 2013) - more descriptive reasons for packet-in
- properties to differentiate optical port properties for fiber optics
- flow monitoring by a controller
- improved role status events for multi-controller configurations
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c o n n e c t i o n− i n t e r r u p t i o n −mode f a i l −s t a n d a l o n e
e n a b l e
e x i t
e n a b l e
e x i t
oobm
i p a d d r e s s 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 2 2 5 5 . 2 5 5 . 2 5 5 . 0
i p d e f a u l t−gateway 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 1
e x i t
v l a n 1
name "DEFAULT_VLAN"
no u n t a g g e d 1−2
u n t a g g e d 3−24 , A1−A2 , B1−B2
i p a d d r e s s dhcp−boo tp
e x i t
v l a n 100
name "OFLAB"
u n t a g g e d 1−2
no i p a d d r e s s
e x i t
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